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The Government on Report.

One Year Since the Parliamentary Elections

Assessment of the electoral commitments of PAS “EU 2028” and the Munteanu and Tofan government programs.

Period under review · September 28, 2025 – September 28, 2026




TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	8
Key Figures for the Year.....	8
Five Findings	8
What Worked.....	9
What Got Worse	10
What We're Asking for in the Second Year.....	10
PART I. Methodological Overview	11
1. What This Report Is and Is Not.....	12
2. Methodology	14
3. A Year of the Architecture of Power	15
4. Election Pledges and Government Programs. Three Documents and a Single Term	17
4.1. The Difference in Architecture	19
4.2. What Remains Consistent Throughout.....	19
4.3. What Disappears or Is Reduced?.....	21
4.4. What is raised or added?	22
4.5. Comparative Table of Quantified Targets.....	24
4.6. Key Conclusion.....	31
PART II. PROMISES VS. ACHIEVEMENTS.....	31
5. The 10 Actions for the First 100 Days.....	32
6. The Five Strategic Objectives	33
7. Sectoral Commitments	36
7.1. Summary of the Assessment of PAS Commitments by Area	38
8. Key Figures	39
8.1. Distribution by Level of Achievement.....	39
8.2. What Achievement Predicts: The Form of Commitment.....	39
8.3. The Most Significant Failures	40
8.4. Achievements That Matter.....	41
8.5. How to Read These Two Lists Together	42
PART III. WHAT HAPPENED WITHOUT BEING PROMISED	42

9. Measures Without an Electoral Mandate	44
9.1. Code on the Organization and Functioning of Parliament	44
9.2. Amendment to the Electoral Code by Law No. 192 of August 25, 2026.....	44
9.3. Restriction on Public Consultation	44
9.4. Fiscal Policy: Promised Predictability and Actual Pace.....	44
9.5. Voluntary Merger: Mandate Exceeded, Consultation to No Avail	44
PART IV. WHERE WE ACTUALLY STAND.....	45
10. What Has Improved	45
10.1. European integration: the first negotiation clusters have been opened	45
10.2. Labor Market and Incomes: Real, but Modest, Growth	46
10.3. Foreign Trade: Exports Rebound, but Structural Performance Has Yet to Be Demonstrated 46	
10.4. Fiscal Measures with a Direct Impact on Households and Small Businesses	50
10.5. Energy: Capacity, Interconnection, Independence	53
10.6. Education: Substantial Increases in Scholarships for Priority Fields	53
10.7. Developments in the Tourism Sector.....	53
11. What Has Worsened	54
11.1. Indicators That Have Deteriorated	54
11.2. Legal safeguards that have been restricted	10
12. What Cannot Be Verified—and Why	8
12.1. Commitments Formulated in Such a Way That They Cannot Be Verified by Anyone	10
12.2. Data that exists but is not proactively published.....	10
12.3. Questions asked and left unanswered	10
13. What We're Asking for in the Second Year	8

We do not evaluate the government based on our political preferences, but rather on the commitments it has publicly made and the standards it has set for itself.

Reference documents

Document	What it contains	Why we use it
PAS "EU 2028" Electoral Platform	Five strategic objectives, 21 sectoral chapters, 10 actions to be completed within 100 days, and four-year objectives.	This is the proposal on which the vote of September 28, 2025, was based.
The Munteanu Governmen t's Program The Tofan Government's Program	These reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, the PAS's campaign pledges	They are used not directly to assess the degree of implementation, but to analyze the extent to which PAS's commitments have been translated into program actions.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report assesses what the government has accomplished during its first year in office, based exclusively on its own campaign promises. The period evaluated is **September 28, 2025, through September 28, 2026**. We evaluated, item by item, **325 sectoral commitments** from the PAS “EU 2028” election platform, the **10 actions** pledged for the first 100 days, the **five strategic objectives** of the term, and the relevant actions from the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. The assessment is based on public data; where such data is lacking, we have indicated the institution and the subject of the request for access to information.

Figures for the year

Indicator	Result
Sectoral commitments assessed	325
Fully Achieved	18 — 5.5%
Fully, partially, or formally fulfilled	26 — 8.0%
Not implemented, with no work started	56 — 17.2%
In progress, but behind schedule	86 — 26.5%, of which 47 are well behind schedule
In progress, with no demonstrable delay	153 — 47.1%
Impossible to verify based on their wording alone	200 — 61.5%

The ratio between these figures speaks louder than each one individually: **for every commitment fully implemented, there are more than three commitments that have not even begun and nearly five that are progressing more slowly than they should.** “In progress” does not mean “unfulfilled,” and the high proportion of this category one year into a four-year term is normal and expected. The cause for concern is the proportion, not the category itself.

Five Findings

1. What gets done and what doesn’t follows a pattern. We cross-referenced the degree of completion with the type of commitment and verified the results item by item. A commitment is fulfilled when it continues an already institutionalized administrative process and is carried out through an act that the authority can issue on its own. A commitment is not fulfilled when it requires a new political decision, a new regulation, or new funding. The consequence for the second year is clear: the “easy” commitments were fulfilled in the first year, and what remains for the next three years consists mostly of commitments that have not progressed at all.

2. Democratic safeguards have been curtailed without an electoral mandate. Twelve legal safeguards were curtailed through legislation passed during the reference period—ranging from oversight of the emergency procedure in Parliament and the right to be heard in public consultations, to the local consensus threshold for municipal mergers and the voting threshold for appointing judicial evaluators. In three of the eight cases, the restriction was introduced via an amendment after the public consultation had ended, and in two of them, one day before the final vote. None of them were included in the electoral platform. This is,

in our view, **the report's central finding**: the measures restrict precisely the mechanisms through which a society can object to decisions that affect it, and they were adopted through the very procedure they restrict.

3. At the current pace, the major targets are out of reach within this term. Of the five strategic objectives, one has made decisive progress—the opening of the first rounds of negotiations with the European Union—three have a measurable arithmetic gap, and one has been partially achieved. Real incomes are growing by 3.4% per year; the promised doubling would require about 19% annually and, at the current pace, would take approximately twenty-one years. Road construction is progressing at about 7% of the required annual pace. Connecting all localities to the water supply would take, at the 2025 pace, about thirteen years. The minimum wage rose from 5,500 to 6,300 lei, compared to a target of 10,000.

4. The hardest part to explain is the commitments that cost nothing. Automatically granting the second teaching rank to faculty members with scientific titles required a ministerial order, with no budgetary cost and no parliamentary vote—the relevant regulation was amended during that period, but the provision was never included. Schools' direct access to "European Village" required an amendment to the applicant's guide, which remained unchanged. Alongside these stands the year's unfulfilled key commitment: in the second quarter of 2026, the average salary in education was 13,810.5 lei, compared to 16,895.7 lei across the economy—a gap of about 18% from a promise of parity— and the healthcare pay reform has been postponed until January 1, 2027.

5. Two-thirds of the program cannot be verified by anyone. 200 of the 325 sectoral commitments—61.5%—contain no figures, no deadlines, and no legislation to be adopted. A commitment that cannot be verified cannot be breached either; in terms of political accountability, it is not a commitment. Added to this is a separate issue of transparency: for a number of items, the information certainly exists with a public authority but is not proactively published, even though Law No. 148/2023 requires it.

What Worked

The achievements of this period are real, and we acknowledge them as such. The most significant is the opening, in June 2026, of **the first negotiation clusters with the European Union**—"Fundamentals" and "External Relations"—following the completion of the bilateral screening. In **education**, there is a set of concrete and verifiable results: scholarships increased by 50% for priority fields of study, the national bullying prevention program, the eduresurse.md platform, and the new funding formula for early childhood education institutions. **The threshold for registration as a VAT payer** was raised above the target set. **Bilateral pension agreements** have been signed, progress has been made **on the 400 kV electricity interconnection** with Romania, and the "European Court" program has exceeded its target for the number of courts funded. The pattern is consistent: achievements are concentrated in areas where the administration could make decisions on its own, quickly, and without significant cost.

What Has Worsened

The resident population decreased by **22,900 people** in one year, with migration being the main factor. The absolute poverty rate was **31.1%** in 2025—40.0% in rural areas and 46.5% in the Southern region. Annual inflation reached **7%** in August 2026, and the National Bank's base rate rose from 5.0% to 9% over five months. Foreign direct investment fell by **5%**. The trade deficit reached **3,335.2 million euros**, with exports covering 33.1% of imports. Public debt reached **143.09 billion lei**, about 37% of GDP, and the cost of servicing it rose

by **24.8%**—faster than any other category of public spending. Added to this are a number of cases that have revealed either the inability of institutions to carry out their duties or the persistence of nepotism and corruption.

What We Are Calling for in the Second Year

We are making **thirteen recommendations**, grouped into five areas: catching up on backlogs and accountability for results; clearer rules for the functioning of the state; economic stability and growth in real incomes; investments and infrastructure measured in physical output, not in funds raised; public services and administrative reform evaluated based on what the citizen receives. The first of these summarizes the others: **a public plan to address backlogs**, with priorities, deadlines, a responsible institution, and measurable indicators for each outstanding commitment.

A methodological note, applicable to the entire report: the figures above measure the implementation of commitments, not the state of the country. They do not, on their own, explain social and economic indicators and should not be read as a causal explanation of them. The report does not claim more than it can demonstrate.

PART I. METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

1. What This Report Is and Is Not

This report is not an evaluation of the term of office—the term lasts four years, and the report measures performance during the first year. Furthermore, the report does not provide, for each individual action, a qualitative assessment or an evaluation of the action’s implementation, except in cases where this is evident and can be noted. In most cases, assessing the actual implementation of an adopted legislative act, for example, would require a complex and multifaceted analysis of a single action.

The report assesses the degree to which the ruling party has fulfilled its campaign promises, which were incorporated, to a greater or lesser extent, into the two government programs of the Munteanu and Tofan administrations.

The assessment is based largely on publicly available data, with data on certain actions requested from the relevant institutions.

2. Methodology

The period covered, the sources used, and the rating scale applied to each commitment:

Scope	What it means
Achieved	The commitment has been fulfilled, with a legislative act adopted or a verifiable result.
In progress	There are documented concrete steps: a registered project, a signed contract, or an allocated budget.
In progress, behind schedule	Certain steps have been taken, but they are either delayed or fewer than required for the period
In progress, significantly behind schedule	Certain steps have been taken, but they are insufficient to achieve the established objective
Not achieved	No action has been taken to fulfill the commitment
Action contrary to the commitment	Action was taken in the opposite direction of the commitment made.

3. A Year of Power Politics

Voting results. In the parliamentary elections held on September 28, 2025, with a voter turnout of 52.24%, five candidates surpassed the electoral threshold:

Candidate	Votes	%	Seats
Action and Solidarity Party	792,557	50.20%	55
“Patriotic” Electoral Bloc	381,984	24.20%	26
“Alternative” Electoral Bloc	125,706	7.96%	8
Our Party	97,852	6.20%	6
“Democracy at Home” Party	88,679	5.62%	6
TOTAL			101

Parliament. The Constitutional Court validated the mandates of the 101 deputies on October 16, 2025; the 12th legislature was convened on October 22. Igor Grosu was elected Speaker of Parliament with 55 votes, compared to 32 for Alexandr Stoianoglo. Six parliamentary groups were formed—PAS with 55 deputies, the Socialist Party with 17, the Communist Party with 8, “Alternativa” with 8, “Our Party” with 6, “Democracy at Home” with 6—and one unaffiliated MP, Vasile Tarlev. The “Patriotic” Bloc, elected as a single list with 26 seats, split into three components at the first session.

The Munteanu Government. Alexandru Munteanu was appointed prime minister on October 24, 2025. The vote of confidence was granted on October 31, 2025, with 55 votes—all from the PAS faction. No cabinet reshuffles took place during his term. On July 3, 2026, after eight months and three days, the prime minister announced his resignation, stating: “Once I realized that I could no longer carry out my mandate in accordance with my principles and convictions, I chose to step down.” Eugeniu Osmochescu served as interim prime minister.

The Tofan Government. Parliament approved the government led by Vasile Tofan on July 21, 2026, with 53 votes; the oath of office was administered on July 22. Twelve ministers were retained, and four portfolios were filled by new appointees: Finance—Victoria Belous, Agriculture—Radu Musteață, Health—Alexandru Gasnaș, and Culture—Dan Suruceanu. On July 24, 2026, two days after the swearing-in, Radu Musteață resigned. On August 25, 2026, Eugeniu Osmochescu moved from Economic Development to Agriculture, and Claudiu Năsui was nominated for Economic Development—he was granted Moldovan citizenship by presidential decree on the same day. Both were sworn in on August 28, 2026.

Institutional Overview. One Parliament, two sworn-in governments, three prime ministers—one interim—and five ministries with changed heads, of which the Ministry of Agriculture had three in a single year, one of whom served for just two days. The Tofan government is not evaluated in this report (see Section 2).

4. Election pledges and government programs. Three documents and a single term.

Comparison of the three documents 1) *The “EU 2028” election platform of the Action and Solidarity Party for the parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025—the platform on which the vote was based;*

(2) *The Government’s Action Program “EU, PEACE, DEVELOPMENT” (the Alexandru Munteanu Government, sworn in on October 31, 2025, with 55 votes; resignation announced on July 3, 2026);* (3) *The Government’s Action Program “European Economy, Efficient State” (Vasile Tofan Government, sworn in on July 22, 2026, with 53 votes; program published in the Official Gazette on July 22, 2026, 147 pages),* is significant because it highlights the changes that occurred between the time of the campaign promise or commitment, the time the government took office, and the subsequent change in the government lineup after nearly one year in office.

The three documents describe the same political direction but not the same level of commitment. A gradual decline in specificity can be observed among them: the election platform contains the highest figures; the Munteanu program adopts them almost in their entirety; and the Tofan program retains some, reduces others, and abandons the rest—without indicating anywhere that it is doing so.

In substance, there is genuine continuity. The strategic direction is identical—accession to the European Union, a market economy, digitalization, judicial reform, and peaceful reintegration. Of the 16 priorities in the Munteanu program, none has been abandoned as a policy area: the 15 sectoral chapters of the Tofan program cover them in full.

In terms of methodology, the Tofan program represents a leap forward. The Munteanu program is approximately fifteen pages long and contains 113 commitments, with no deadlines, no responsible institutions, and no indicators. The Tofan program is 147 pages long, featuring a diagnostic chapter with data, five strategic priorities, and fifteen sectoral chapters; each chapter concludes with a “Development Indicators” table, including a baseline and a target for 2029. From the perspective of civic monitoring, it is a document clearly superior to the two that preceded it.

Regarding the content of the numerical commitments, however, there has been an unannounced recalibration. Doubling the income of the working-age population—the campaign’s second strategic objective—no longer includes any specific figure. The target of 3,000 km of roads has been reduced to 100 km per year. The target of 60,000 hectares of forest has been reduced to 7,000 per year. The number of daycare spots has dropped from 5,000 to 3,000, and the number of students in dual higher education programs has fallen from 1,000 to 450 annually. Two areas that had their own sections in the campaign platform—sports and youth policy—no longer appear at all.

The phrase that most accurately describes the relationship between the three is this: the Tofan program is the campaign platform re-examined through the lens of one year of implementation. It is more realistic, much more measurable, and—on the issues that dominated the campaign—less ambitious.

4.1. The Difference in Structure

Criterion	PAS “EU 2028” (Sept. 2025)	Munteanu (Oct. 2025)	Tofan (July 2026)
Nature of the document	Election Platform	Government Program	Government Program

Criterion	PAS “EU 2028” (Sept. 2025)	Munteanu (Oct. 2025)	Tofan (July 2026)
Length	62 pages	approx. 15 pages	147 pages
Structure	5 strategic objectives, 21 sectoral chapters, 10 actions for the first 100 days	Vision + 16 sectoral priorities	Vision · Structural Challenges · 5 Strategic Priorities · 15 Sectoral Chapters
Identifiable commitments	336 actions and indicators	113	several hundred, by priority areas and implementation measures
Deadlines	2027, 2028, 2029, 2030 (partially)	none explicitly stated	2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, depending on the measure
Baseline indicators	none	none	“Development Indicators” table at the end of each chapter
Initial assessment	“What We’ve Achieved in 4 Years” sections, retrospective	absent	separate chapter with data: GDP +0.4% in Q1 2026; imports nearly three times higher than exports; nearly one-third of citizens living in poverty; approximately 21% of the population is 63 years old or older
Reporting mechanism	absent	absent	absent — the document concludes with the table of indicators for the “Culture” chapter

This difference is not a matter of style. A program without indicators can only be evaluated through interpretation; a program with a baseline and a target can be verified by anyone. We note, however, that the existence of indicators does not imply the existence of a reporting mechanism: none of the three documents specifies who publishes the progress reports, in what form, or at what intervals.

4.2. What remains consistent throughout

Areas

The 16 priorities of the Munteanu program are reflected in the 15 sectoral chapters of the Tofan program, with two structural adjustments: “European Integration” and “Effective Governance” are elevated from sectoral chapters to strategic priorities (Priorities 2 and 3), and “Finance” becomes a distinct chapter, although in the Munteanu program the fiscal component was included under “Prosperous Economy.”

Identical targets in all three documents

- investments of at least 6 billion lei in educational and research infrastructure, with the same breakdown in all three: over 4 billion in schools and kindergartens, over 1.1 billion in vocational and technical institutions, and over 2 billion in universities;
- expansion of the Model Schools network to 90 institutions—to which the Tofan program adds an operational detail absent from the other two: “the operationalization of at least 35 schools from the first wave”;

- the annual integration of at least 500 young teachers, of whom at least 250 are graduates of domestic programs—a phrase taken word for word from the campaign platform;
- support for the employment of at least 100,000 people, rephrased by Tofan as “the integration into the workforce of at least 100,000 people through ANOFM”;
- 80% of children with special educational needs to have a guaranteed path after middle school;
- a pass rate of at least 80% on 9th-grade exams, across all subjects and in all districts—which Tofan supplements with a specific target: approximately 71% in mathematics by 2025.

The European Timeline

Strategic Objective No. 1 of the campaign—“Signing the EU accession treaty by 2028”—becomes, in Munteanu’s version, “Finalizing negotiations with the European Union by 2028,” and in Tofan’s plan, it is detailed at the operational level: opening all six negotiation clusters in 2026, prioritizing Cluster 1 “Fundamental Values,” finalizing negotiations, and preparing for the signing of the Accession Treaty by the end of 2028.

The Tofan program adds a commitment absent from the other two: “full implementation of the actions in the Roadmap by the end of 2027.”

3. WHAT IS BEING REMOVED OR REDUCED

4.3. What is being dropped or scaled back?

This is the part of the comparison that directly answers the question posed by the report’s title: what has been abandoned between the campaign and the administration.

Doubling incomes: from a number to an adjective

Election platform: “We aim to increase the minimum wage from 5,500 lei to 10,000 lei by 2030”; “The average wage should reach at least 25,000 lei by 2030.” Munteanu’s platform incorporates both: “A gradual increase in the minimum wage to at least 10,000 lei and in the average wage to at least 25,000 lei.”

Tofan’s platform does not include either of these two figures. The commitment becomes: “The minimum wage will increase predictably.”

We are not claiming that the goal was abandoned for political reasons. We are stating that it has ceased to be verifiable. A citizen can determine whether the minimum wage has reached 10,000 lei; they cannot determine whether it has increased “predictably.”

Roads: from 3,000 km to 100 km per year

Election platform, strategic objective no. 4: “Up to 3,000 km of additional roads, built or repaired by 2029, so that the entire network of national and regional roads is in good condition.” Munteanu’s platform: “Modernization of up to 3,000 km of national and regional roads.” Over four years, this would amount to approximately 750 km per year.

The Tofan Program: “Modernization or rehabilitation of at least 100 km of national roads annually, funded by the state budget and external financing,” plus “over 500 km of local roads” through “European Village II” and “Europe Is Close.”

The ratio between the two annual targets is approximately 1 to 7. However, for the sake of accuracy, we note that the new target is the one consistent with actual performance—206 km repaired in 2025 and approximately 210 km planned for 2026. The Tofan Program does not lower its ambition below the level achieved; it brings it in line with the level achieved.

Forests: from 60,000 hectares to 7,000 per year

Election platform: “We will ensure the planting of an additional 60,000 hectares of new forests.”

Munteanu’s platform: “Planting up to 60,000 hectares of forest by 2029.” Tofan’s platform:

“Planting and restoring at least 7,000 hectares in 2026 and maintaining a sustained annual pace,” along with a new institutional measure—“completing the reform and consolidation of the 19 forestry enterprises.”

At 7,000 hectares per year, by 2029 the total will reach approximately 21,000–28,000 hectares—between one-third and one-half of the previous target. We also note a change in wording: the phrase “planting and restoration” includes restored areas, not just new forests, which makes the two figures even harder to compare.

Daycare Centers and Dual Higher Education

Daycare centers: The electoral platform and Munteanu’s program called for at least 5,000 new spots; Tofan’s program calls for 3,000 spots “created or contracted” by 2029. This represents a 40% reduction, compounded by a lowering of the threshold for counting—a contracted spot is not the same as a functional spot.

Dual higher education: The election platform called for “at least 1,000 students admitted annually,” while the Munteanu platform called for “1,000 students” in dual programs. The Tofan platform calls for “a minimum of 450 students admitted annually, on track to reach 600 by 2030,” starting from a stated benchmark of

200. The target remains less than half of the promised level.

For the sake of balance, we note that in the case of dual vocational-technical education, the trend is the opposite: from 2,500 students annually to a minimum of 2,900.

Targets that disappear without a numerical replacement

- Irrigation: Both the electoral platform and Munteanu’s program called for the rehabilitation of centralized irrigation systems covering at least 50,000 hectares. Tofan’s program mentions irrigation fourteen times, but exclusively in qualitative terms—“expanded access to irrigation,” subsidies aimed at “modernization, technological advancement, and irrigation”—without specifying any target area. The word “hectare” appears only once in the entire document, in the chapter on the environment.
- “The European Village”: 8 billion lei in the election platform, at least 9 billion in Munteanu’s program (together with “The European Court”). The Tofan program continues these initiatives and launches “European Village III” and “Europe Is Close II,” but without specifying an amount.
- Residential energy efficiency: 2,510 individual heating units and thermal insulation for 57 apartment buildings—figures identical in both the election platform and Munteanu’s program. In Tofan’s

program, this area has its own subchapter (4.10.5), which is covered in detail.

- Horizon Europe: 30 million euros in the campaign platform; in Tofan's plan, "at least 20–25 million euros, on track toward 30 million." The target remains as a trajectory, not as a commitment.

Two areas that are disappearing as public policies

Sports had its own chapter (VIII) in the campaign platform, with 22 commitments, including increasing the annual budget to 1 billion lei, at least 600 million lei for sports infrastructure by 2028, 400 million for sports schools, increasing the number of

10 to 5 out of 10 citizens engaging in physical activity, and the "Sports Voucher" pilot program. Munteanu's program included "investing up to 1 billion lei annually in sports and piloting the 'Sports Voucher' program."

In the Tofan program, sports has no chapter, section, or specific target. The word "athlete" appears only once in the entire document, incidentally, in a list within the chapter on reintegration ("joint cultural, educational, sports, and community projects between the two banks"). The phrase "physical education" does not appear at all.

Youth policy also had its own chapter in the electoral program (VII. Youth), with 15 commitments. In the Tofan program, the word "youth" never appears. Young people are mentioned 38 times, but as beneficiaries of other policies—young educators, young researchers, young people from the Transnistrian region

— not as a sector with its own objectives.

This does not necessarily mean that those policies have been discontinued; they may exist in sector-specific documents. It means that they no longer appear in the current governing document and, therefore, can no longer be monitored in relation to it.

4.4. What Is Being Added or Expanded

The comparison would be biased if it focused solely on cuts. In several areas, the Tofan program is more ambitious than both of the documents that preceded it.

Increased Targets

- Renewable energy: from 30% of total energy consumption (the election platform and Munteanu's program) to "over 35% by 2028," with specified instruments—competitive auctions, contracts for difference, grid access, prosumers, and energy communities.
- Teacher salaries: the election platform called for "a base salary at least equal to the national average wage"; the Munteanu program contained no target in this regard; the Tofan program calls for "at least 120% of the national average," starting from a stated benchmark of 101.8%.
- Dual vocational-technical education: from 2,500 students annually to "at least 2,900 young people, on track to reach 3,000 by 2030."

- Academic results: the vague goal of “performance comparable to Romania’s on PISA” becomes a numerical target—a minimum of 55% in math and 60% in reading and science on PISA 2029, compared to a baseline of 44.3% in math, 51% in reading, and 51.4% in science.
- Administrative-territorial reorganization: from “another 100 mergers” (the election platform) and “continuing the merger process” (Munteanu) to “administrative-territorial reorganization centered on strong municipalities, with a fundamental restructuring of the district level and the transfer of powers, personnel, and assets to the new territorial-administrative units.” This is not a continuation, but a fundamental change in the nature of the reform.

New commitments, absent from both previous documents

- Employment rate for the population aged 20–64: from 57% in 2025 to 62% in 2029.
- Reduce the shortage of teachers to fewer than 1,000 by September 2027.
- Reduce the rural–Chişinău gap in mathematics for 9th graders by at least one-third (benchmark: approximately 24 percentage points).
- Exports of technology products and services: from approximately 1 billion euros to 2 billion by 2029.
- Digital public services: 10 life events fully digitized and 100% of priority public services available digitally by 2029.
- Modern technology coverage along the border: from 25% to 60% by 2029.
- Energy: at least 1,200 MWh of battery storage and at least 100 MW of flexible gas-fired power plants by 2028; high-efficiency cogeneration at Termoelectrica, including the 55 MW projects and preparation for an investment of approximately 250 MWe/180 MWt.
- Healthcare: a three-year retention rate of at least 85% for medical staff assigned to rural areas; quality management in all public hospitals, with evaluations of institutions and managers based on performance and patient satisfaction.
- Tourism: a 30% increase in tourists compared to 2024 and approximately 5,000 new jobs; the “Tourism 2029” program.
- Capital Market: Support for at least 10 local companies to go public.
- A new local development program—“Europe Is Close,” alongside “European Village II.”

4.5. Comparative Table of Quantified Targets

The table compares the wording from the three documents side by side. Where a document does not contain a target for the relevant area, “absent” is indicated. The “Assessment” column compares only the current government program with the campaign platform.

Area	“EU 2028” Action Plan	Munteanu Government	Tofan Government	Assessment (Tofan vs. PAS)
Minimum Wage	10,000 lei by 2030	at least 10,000 lei	“will rise predictably,” no specific figure given	Target abandoned
Average salary	25,000 lei by 2030	at least 25,000 lei	Not specified	Target abandoned
National roads	up to 3,000 km by 2029	up to 3,000 km	at least 100 km/year	Reduced by about 7 times
European Village	at least 8 billion lei	at least 9 billion lei (with the “European Court”)	over 500 km of local roads local roads; new editions, no amount specified	No financial target
Forests	an additional 60,000 ha	up to 60,000 ha by 2029	at least 7,000 ha by 2026, sustained pace	Reduced to 1/3–1/2
Irrigation	at least 50,000 ha	at least 50,000 ha	High-quality irrigation, no surface area	Target Abandoned
Daycare centers	At least 5,000 new spots	At least 5,000 new spots	3,000 spots created or contracted	Reduced by 40%
Renewable renewable	30% of consumption	up to 30% of consumption	over 35% by 2028	Increased
Generation capacity	2 power plants of 55 MW each by 2027; construction of one 250 MW plant	at least 300 MW; storage capacity of at least 275 MW	At least 100 MW of flexible gas-fired capacity + 1,200 MWh of storage by 2028	Recalibrated
Residential energy efficiency	2,510 heating stations; 57 thermally insulated apartment buildings	2,510 heating points thermal; 57 blocks	separate subsection, covered in detail	No numerical target
Employment	support for 100,000 people	support for 100,000 people	100,000 through ANOFM + employment rate for ages 20–64: 57% → 62% (2029)	Retained and supplemented
Investments in education	at least 6 billion lei (4 + 1.1 + 2)	at least 6 billion lei	at least 6 billion lei (4 + 1.1 + 2)	Same
Model Schools	90 institutions	90 institutions	90 + 35 operationalized in the first wave	Retained and clarified
Young teachers	500 annually, at least 250 from across the country, 25% STEM	At least 500 annually	500 annually, at least 250 from across the country; deficit below 1,000 by September 2027	Retained and supplemented
Teachers’ salaries	At least at the national average	Absent	At least 120% of the economy-wide average (benchmark: 101.8%)	Increased

Dual vocational-technical	2,500 students annually	At least 2,500 students annually	At least 2,900, approaching 3,000 in 2030	Increased
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Field	“EU 2028” Action Plan	Munteanu Government	Tofan Government	Assessment (Tofan vs. PAS)
Dual university	at least 1,000 students annually	1,000 students	at least 450 annually, rising to 600 by 2030 (benchmark: 200)	Reduced by 55%
International students	At least 3,000 per year	Not specified	At least 3,000 per year	Maintained
Graduates from universities in the country	7 out of 10	7 out of 10	At least 7 out of 10 (benchmark below 60%)	Maintained, with benchmark
Horizon Europe	30 million euros	Not specified	at least 20–25 million euros, approaching 30 million	Reduced as a commitment
Children with special educational needs	80% adapted education	80% access to adapted education	At least 80% with a guaranteed path after middle school	Maintained
9th-grade exams	At least 80% pass rate	At least 80% pass rate	minimum 80% (benchmark of approximately 71% in math in 2025)	Maintained, with benchmark
PISA	“comparable to Romania”	Not specified	min. 55% in math; 60% in reading and science (2029)	Quantified
EU accession	Signing of the Treaty by 2028	Negotiations completed by 2028	6 clusters by 2026; Treaty prepared by the end of 2028; Roadmap implemented by the end of 2027	Retained and detailed
Merger	an additional 100 mergers in 4 years	Continuation of the process	fundamental of the district level, with the transfer of powers, personnel, and assets	Changed in nature
Sports	1 billion lei/year; 600 million infrastructure; 5 out of 10 active citizens; Sports Voucher	up to 1 billion lei/year; Sports Voucher	Not listed as a sector	Category removed
Youth	separate chapter, 15 commitments	vague wording	the word “youth” does not appear in the document	Category removed
Cultural Voucher	Expansion to ages 16–18 and seniors	Expansion to ages 16–18 and seniors	Extended from age 16	Partially retained

4.6. Key Conclusion

The Tofan Program is a continuation: the same parliamentary majority, the same direction, the same areas in overwhelming proportion, the same time horizon—the indicators refer to 2029, the end of the same term. There is no break in public policy.

However, there is also a change in the contract with the voter. Six of the numerical commitments in the campaign platform no longer have a numerical counterpart in the current governing document; four have been substantially reduced; and two entire areas have disappeared as distinct public policies. This change was not announced as such and was not publicly explained; it can only be observed by comparing the three texts.

Consequently, this report will adopt the following approach:

1. The PAS “EU 2028” electoral program applies to the entire period from September 28, 2025, to September 28, 2026. It is the platform on which the election was based and is not altered by a change in government. The Munteanu Program is not evaluated separately.
2. The Tofan program is not evaluated in terms of its degree of implementation—its term begins on July 22, 2026. It may be evaluated in the next annual evaluation exercise.

Clarification on Fairness

Recalibrating a target to an achievable level is not, in itself, a breach of commitment. A government that replaces an impossible promise with a feasible one is acting responsibly, and the case of roads illustrates this: 100 km per year is the target consistent with actual performance, whereas 750 km per year has never been achieved.

The problem is not the recalibration itself, but the silence that accompanies it. Nowhere in the Tofan program does it state that the 3,000-km target becomes 100 km per year, that the 60,000-hectare target becomes 7,000 per year, that the goal of doubling revenues no longer has a specific figure, or that sports and youth programs no longer have their own objectives. A 147-page document that sets baseline indicators could have also included a section on what is no longer being pursued and why.

PART II. PROMISES VS. ACHIEVEMENTS

This section compares, point by point, what was promised on September 28, 2025, with what was accomplished by September 28, 2026. It is based on three distinct lists, excerpted from the “EU 2028” election platform, and on the attached monitoring tables:

- **the 10 actions committed to for the first 100 days** in office (Section 5);
- **the five strategic objectives** of the four-year term (Section 6);
- the program’s **325 sector-specific actions**, organized into 18 chapters (Section 7).

These three lists are not mutually exclusive: the 100-day actions and the strategic objectives summarize, in condensed form, commitments that also appear in the sectoral chapters. We treat them separately because their accountability frameworks differ—the first have their own deadlines, the second have a four-year timeframe, and the third group constitutes the actual campaign platform. The totals do not add up.

A necessary caveat before presenting any figures: One year is 25% of a term. Nothing that follows should be interpreted as a verdict on the term. What can be said after the first year is whether or not the observed pace is leading toward the stated goal—and, above all, which commitments have already been treated, in practice, as nonexistent.

5. The 10 Actions for the First 100 Days

The Munteanu government was sworn in on October 31, 2025. The 100-day deadline therefore expired around February 9, 2026. We assessed each action at this deadline, not at the end of the reference period; where the result emerged later, we state this explicitly, but the 100-day commitment remains unfulfilled by the deadline.

No.	Promised Action	Category	Key Finding
1	Completion of the construction of 200 km of local roads	Requires verification	There is no consolidated public data for local roads. The available figures (206 km in 2025) refer to national and regional roads. Cannot be verified from open sources.
2	Voucher for young people worth 2,000 lei, for cultural and sports expenses	Partially implemented — below promised targets	The “Cultural Voucher” program was expanded as of January 15, 2026, to include 16-year-olds. The amount remained 1,000 lei, not 2,000, and the sports component is not covered.
3	Launch of the renovation of the first 20 model schools	Not achieved	On March 22, 2026—a month and a half after the deadline—the Ministry of Education and Research (MEC) reported 10 schools. Under the definition applied since July 2026 (actual construction work), there were 3.

No.	Promised Action	Category	Key Finding
4	Opening of 50 soup kitchens	Not Achieved	Social canteens are established by local authorities and private providers. The package dated December 23, 2025, updated the framework (repealing Government Decision No. 1246/2003), but did not create the funding line without which the commitment could not be fulfilled.
5	Additional funding for another 100 courtyards in Chişinău	Achieved — exceeded	On November 26, 2025, 25 days after taking office, the Government included an additional 380 courtyards in the 2025–2027 investment program. Total “European Courtyard”: 469 courtyards, over 1.7 billion lei from the FNDRL.
6	Expanding the criteria for applying the law on the repatriation of the diaspora	Not Achieved	The law of December 29, 2025, was adopted, but the eligibility criteria were amended only with regard to the specifications of the equipment brought into the country. In the Diaspora chapter of the same program, the commitment has a target—at least 1,000 beneficiaries—which the 100-day list omits. The deadline for implementing the law is December 31, 2026. Thus, in light of the program’s numerical target, this objective is considered unmet.
7	Fund for Financing Local Public Administration’s Own Contributions	Not Achieved	It first appears in April 2026 in the “Strong Municipalities” Concept—a policy document, not a legislative act, with no specified amount, funding source, deadline, or responsible party.
8	Increase in the VAT threshold to 1.5 million lei	Achieved — exceeded	The threshold rose from 1.2 to 1.5 million lei as of January 1, 2026, and, following a vote on February 19, 2026, to 1.7 million lei as of March 1, 2026.
9	Legislation for small producers: dedicated shelves, the “Made in Moldova,” five regional markets	Not Achieved	For none of the three components was any public evidence found to demonstrate implementation.
10	Tax exemption for education expenses, 20,000 lei	Achieved	The deduction of up to 20,000 lei annually applies as of January 1, 2026, cumulatively for all types of beneficiaries (Law No. 318/2025). Expanded compared to the initial wording.

Results of the 100-day list: 3 actions completed—two of which exceeded expectations—1 partially completed, 5 uncompleted, and one that cannot be verified from public sources.

This distribution is not random. The three completed actions share a common element: they were carried out through a decision that the government could make on its own and immediately—a resolution to include them in the investment program, an amendment to the Tax Code that was already drafted, and a tax deduction. The five unfulfilled actions, in turn, share a common element: each required a new budget line item (social cafeterias, the local public administration co-financing fund), a scope of work that could not be completed in 100 days (the 20 model schools), or a change in criteria affecting the number of beneficiaries (repatriation). This is not a matter of administrative will, but rather of calibrating the promise: four of the ten actions undertaken for

the first 100 days were not carried out, which indicates either promises made without a realistic assessment or an inability to implement them within the announced timeframe.

Two methodological observations are worth noting, as they recur throughout the report. First: **the shortened commitment loses its indicator**. Item 6 on the 100-day list promises to “expand the criteria for applying the law on repatriation”; the same commitment, in the Diaspora chapter, promises that “the number of beneficiaries will reach at least 1,000.” The short list does not include the figure, and the official report referred to the short list. Second: **an achievement that has been surpassed is not necessarily a credit to the current administration**. The 469 courtyards in Chişinău represent a tangible result, but they are part of a pre-existing investment program whose expansion was already underway—unlike the 50 social cafeterias, which would have required the creation of a new initiative.

6. The Five Strategic Objectives

Strategic objectives have a timeframe corresponding to the term of office—2028, 2029, or 2030, as applicable. They cannot be declared achieved or unachieved after just one year. What can be measured is **the pace**: the ratio between what has been accomplished in the first year and what should have been accomplished to keep the target within reach.

	Objective	Context	Pace Observed in the First Year
O1	Signing of the EU accession treaty by 2028	In progress — progress is being made, but the pace is insufficient to meet the target	On November 4, 2025, the Enlargement Package noted the completion of the screening process and the adoption of the roadmaps. On June 16, 2026, the first two negotiation clusters were opened—“Foundations” and “External Relations.” This is the most significant achievement of the year. However, the outstanding issues in Roadmaps No. 275 and No. 276 pertain precisely to this cluster.
O2	Doubling the income of the working-age population within 4 years (minimum wage of 10,000 lei)	In progress—behind schedule	The minimum wage has increased from 5,500 to 6,300 lei (+14.5%), and the projected average wage from 16,100 to 17,400 lei (+8%). To reach the target, a cumulative increase of approximately 59% would still be required.
O3	Doubling the value of domestic exports by 2030	In progress—behind schedule	Volume, from the national accounts (NBS): Period Exports of goods and services, volume 2025 +4.4% First half of 2026 +12.2% This is the decisive data series: it is official, expressed in volume (eliminating both inflation and exchange rate effects), and covers both goods and services—that is, precisely the subject of the commitment. It is, moreover, a generous measure for the government, as it includes reexports, which the commitment excludes.
O4	Up to 3,000 km of roads built or repaired by 2029	In progress—well below the required pace	206 km repaired in 2025 (of which only 15.39 km were major repairs) and approximately 210 km planned for 2026—about 7% of the annual target. At this pace, the objective cannot be met.

	Objective	Framework	Pace observed in the first year
O5	Program to promote national culture and traditions, both domestically and among the diaspora	Partially achieved	The programs cited—the Diaspora Engagement Hub and “Access to Culture”—existed prior to the reference period. The 2026 edition introduces a new element (partnerships with nonprofit organizations), but no new programs were created.

The five objectives fall clearly into two groups. **Only one has made progress through favorable external decisions and effective administrative work**—the opening of the “Fundamentals” cluster on June 16, 2026, is the most significant outcome of the entire period. **Three show a measurable arithmetic gap** between the first-year pace and the required pace: revenue, roads, and, fundamentally, exports. **One cannot be verified** due to a lack of data series, and the last was achieved using tools that already existed.

The gap in O4 is worth noting as a benchmark for the entire report. A commitment of 3,000 km over five years means 600 km per year. The actual pace is approximately 210 km. This is not a failure in execution—the administration has repaired roads—but rather a commitment that was not calibrated from the outset to the Road Fund’s absorption capacity and budget. The same observation applies to O2: a 14.5% increase in the minimum wage over one year is a real increase, but the stated target called for an increase of a different magnitude.

7. Sectoral Commitments

The 325 sectoral actions in the electoral program are divided into 18 chapters. The table below shows their distribution by chapter and by degree of completion. For clarity, similar categories have been grouped: “Achieved” includes fully, partially, and formally achieved actions; “In Progress” includes actions showing good progress; “Behind Schedule” includes actions that are behind schedule or significantly behind schedule. The detailed distribution, across all eleven levels of the grid, can be found in Section 8.

Methodological Note. The numbering of the actions follows the PAS “EU 2028” electoral program, which comprises 336 items. Eleven of these are title statements that introduce groups of actions without themselves constituting separately assessable commitments (items 23, 31, 42, 49, 91, 144, 203, 209, 214, 218, and 222). These were not evaluated—hence the total of 325 commitments. Consequently, the ranges indicated in the chapter titles reflect the numbering in the election platform, not the number of items evaluated in that chapter.

Chapter of the platform	Total	Achieved	In Progress	Behind Schedule	Not completed	Unverified
II. Economy and Fiscal Measures	51	2	17	23	9	0

III. The EU Economic Growth Program	10	0	0	10	0	0
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Program Chapter	Total	Completed	In progress	Behind schedule	Not completed	Not verified
IV. Education and Research	69	13	38	8	9	1
V. Infrastructure	22	1	11	6	4	0
VI. The Diaspora	7	1	3	2	1	0
VII. Youth	15	0	7	6	2	0
VIII. Sports	22	1	4	2	14	1
IX. Social Protection	29	3	14	5	7	0
X. Health	29	2	17	7	3	0
XI. Justice	4	0	0	3	1	0
XII. Culture	8	1	0	3	4	0
XIII. Agriculture	11	1	2	8	0	0
XIV. Environment	11	1	8	1	0	1
XV. The Reunification of the Country	3	0	3	0	0	0
XVI. Energy	12	0	11	0	1	0
XVII. Foreign Policy	4	0	4	0	0	0
XVIII. Chişinău and Urban Development	10	0	7	1	1	1
XIX. Modernization of Public Services	8	0	7	1	0	0
TOTAL	325	26	153	86	56	4

7.1. Summary of the Assessment of PAS Commitments by Area

II. Economy and Fiscal Measures (Actions 1–55)

Of the 51 commitments assessed, two have been fulfilled, 40 are in progress (16 behind schedule and 7 significantly behind schedule), and nine have not been fulfilled. The most tangible results relate to **financing for entrepreneurs**: in the first half of 2026, ODA transferred grants totaling 91.4 million lei to 383 enterprises, the FACEM Impact program granted long-term loans totaling 45.5 million lei to 18 companies, and the regional state aid scheme was expanded to 4 billion lei. In **the capital market**, the International Stock Exchange of Moldova was authorized on August 24, 2026, but trading had not yet begun. The only measures implemented were **raising the VAT registration threshold** (to 1.7 million lei as of March 2026) and **requiring the country of origin to be indicated** on product shelves (effective August 10, 2026, with implementation issues).

Quantified targets remain far off: none of the four promised technology parks has been created (three industrial park designations were granted); the four announced new private investments (364 million euros) are not in the sectors targeted for anchor companies; the budget for promoting the country has increased from 3.85 to 4.16 million lei, not fivefold; approximately 50 million lei are allocated for training the unemployed, not 150; and the law on short supply chains will not take effect until February 2027. Unfulfilled commitments include those regarding **fiscal predictability** (tax changes no more than once every two years, a four-year tax calendar), pre-filled tax returns for SMEs, VAT payment at the point of sale, reimbursement of up to 40% of investment loans, the “Second Chance” program, the single “Made in Moldova” label, the reduction of red tape for market access, and the national audit of information systems.

Conclusion: *In the economy, the first year expanded existing financing instruments, but promises of fiscal stability were not kept, and investments and revenues are growing well below the pace required by the 2030 targets (real average wage: +2.3%).*

III. The EU’s Economic Growth Agenda (Actions 56–65)

All 10 commitments are underway, but nine of them are well behind schedule. The Growth Plan, totaling **1.9 billion euros for 2025–2027**, shows the largest gap between mobilized funding and physical progress. Construction of **the Chișinău Intermodal Terminal** has not yet begun, and **the Berești Multimodal Logistics Complex** is still in the documentation preparation phase. On the railway front, there is one concrete result—the Cantemir–Fălciu segment has been rebuilt and tested—but this represents only a part of the overall railway rehabilitation objective. On **the Chișinău beltway**, one section has been completed, while the others are under construction. The most advanced project is **the 400-kV Vulcănești–Chișinău power line**, which has been completed and is undergoing testing but is not yet in full commercial operation. The Court of Auditors’ audit of **the “European Village” project** highlights not only delays but also issues with the quality of execution.

Conclusion: *Under the Growth Plan, the mobilization of funds is much more visible than its transformation into completed and functional infrastructure.*

IV. Education and Research (Actions 66–135)

Of the 69 commitments, 11 have been completed, one is nearly completed, and one is partially completed; 46 are in progress (six with good progress, eight behind schedule or significantly behind schedule); nine have not been completed; and one is unverifiable. The achievements are primarily **one-off measures for teachers and students**: the allowance for teaching materials extended to technical

and vocational education, scholarships increased by 50% for

teaching specializations with shortages, free digital skills courses, early access to teaching certification for teachers with a B2 digital certificate or a C1 certificate in Romanian, increased pay for exam graders, the national anti-bullying program, the national digital resources platform, resource centers in kindergartens, the new funding formula for kindergartens, the new requirements for textbooks, higher-level dual education, and Gagauz–Romanian bilingual classes in the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit.

The commitments regarding **the status and income of teachers** remain unfulfilled: the average salary and base salary at the level of the national average, hourly pay at the standard rate (including incentives for multilingual education), free meals, and “Prima Casă” housing benefits for teachers. Two outstanding issues required only an administrative act: the automatic granting of Teaching Grade II to holders of academic degrees and direct access for schools to the “European Village” program. The admission of 1,000 students annually into dual education and the expansion of the Model Schools network to 90 institutions remain well behind schedule.

Conclusion: *Education has the highest number of fulfilled commitments among all sectors, but these are one-off measures; promises with a major impact on teachers’ incomes have not been fulfilled.*

V. Infrastructure (Actions 136–158)

Of the 22 commitments evaluated, one has been formally fulfilled, 17 are in progress (six well behind schedule and four making good progress), and four have not been fulfilled; none have been fully fulfilled. The most substantial progress is on **the railway corridor**: for the North–Central segment (Vălcineț–Bălți–Ungheni–Chișinău–Căinari), over 53 million euros have been mobilized, including a 32-million-euro EU grant, while on the Southern Corridor (Bender–Basarabasca–Etulia–Giurgiulești), work on 233 km is at an advanced stage of execution, with an investment of over 150 million euros from the EBRD and the EU. Progress has also been made on **the electrified Ungheni–Iași line** (a “Design & Build” tender worth over 5.6 million euros, with a 24-month timeline, synchronized with the Iași SRCF procedure) and **the in-motion weighing system** (regulations and technical concept approved, five pilot locations selected). The **Cantemir–Fălciu** railway border crossing was formally reopened on April 22, 2026, but its actual operation has not been confirmed.

Roads remain the biggest shortfall: of the 3,000 km of national and regional roads promised, 206 km were repaired in 2025, of which only 15.39 km were major repairs, and for 2026, approximately 210 km of regional roads and eight bridges are planned, with a Road Fund of approximately 1.8 billion lei; over 50% of the roads are in poor condition, according to the relevant minister. **The Iași–Ungheni–Chișinău–Odesa highway** is currently in the bidding phase for the feasibility study of the Ungheni–Budești section (approximately 125 km), financed by the Road Fund, although full funding has not yet been secured. Of **the four bridges across the Prut River**, construction has not yet begun on any of the three new ones—as of August 22, 2026, the feasibility studies were under review, based on design contracts signed in February 2025—while the Ungheni–Ungheni bridge was already under construction before the elections (55% complete as of August 2026). For **water and sanitation**, at the 2025 pace (+36 localities per year), connecting the approximately 472 remaining localities would take about 13 years, and the 2026–2030 National Program, approved on August 12, 2026, with a budget of approximately 598 million lei, replaces the “all localities” target with targets expressed as percentages of the population (95% access to water, 65% sewerage). **The “European Village”** program has continued uninterrupted, but without a new edition: the portfolio approved before the elections is being

implemented, and allocations for local infrastructure, following the budget amendment of September 2, 2026, total approximately 1.28 billion lei—two-thirds of the annual pace required to reach the promised 8 billion. The four commitments in the areas of

housing and sanitation: stimulating the construction of 25,000 **housing units** in the suburban ring of Chişinău (6,250 per year, in a year when the entire country commissioned 333,000 m², the lowest level in the last seven decades), identifying resources for electricity, water, and sewer systems outside the capital, **the National Housing Strategy** (with no evidence of its development or public consultation), and the elimination of **landfills**—where approximately 2,000 unauthorized landfills remain, and the government’s program has changed the target from “over 300” to “up to 300.”

Conclusion: *Infrastructure is making real progress where funding is external and contracted—the railroad, the port—but roads, the highway, bridges over the Prut River, water, and housing are advancing at a pace incompatible with the targets set for the term.*

VI. Diaspora (Actions 159–165)

Of the seven commitments, one has been partially fulfilled, five are ongoing (two of which are well behind schedule), and one has not been fulfilled. The most significant progress relates to **bilateral agreements**: social security agreements have been signed with Canada, Ukraine, and Slovakia; the agreement with Ireland on driver’s licenses has entered into force; and negotiations are continuing with other countries. New instruments have been introduced for **diaspora investments** (“Buy Diaspora,” the migrant component of the CREŞTEM IMM program), and the network of **honorary consuls** has expanded by four consulates; however, neither the diaspora’s eligibility for all support mechanisms nor a separate network of consuls with economic responsibilities has been ensured. **Regional return centers**—which have not been established—and **cultural grants**, whose budget has not been tripled, remain far behind schedule. **Repatriation** has not been achieved: the law has only relaxed the limits on passenger cars, not the eligibility requirements, and the target of 1,000 beneficiaries annually remains far below the average of approximately 137 per year under the previous regime.

Conclusion: *Results are concentrated in diplomacy and small-scale funding instruments; commitments directly aimed at repatriation have not produced the promised effect.*

VII. Youth (Actions 166–180)

Of 15 commitments, 13 are ongoing (six behind schedule or significantly behind schedule) and two have not been implemented. The most tangible results concern **direct financial support**: scholarships have increased by at least 40% since September 1, 2026, stipends for young teachers have been raised on a sliding scale, and the budget for young entrepreneurs has increased by approximately 31.5%. However, none of these increases reaches the promised doubling or 50% increase. **Institutional reforms** (public service recruitment, dual education, paid internships) continue mechanisms established prior to the current term, while efforts regarding **Erasmus+** and **the recognition of EU diplomas** are still in the preparatory or partial stages. The greatest gaps are found in **the quantified targets**: approximately 260 monthly beneficiaries of the “+3,000” program compared to the promised 15,000, and grants for youth organizations have remained at the 2025 level. **The “First Home” program for young teachers** has not been implemented, and the general program has been closed to new applications since April 2026.

Conclusion: *The youth sector has the most concrete results within the Diaspora–Youth–Sports segment, but nearly all fall short of the targeted figures.*

VIII. Sports (Actions 181–202)

Of 22 commitments, 14 have not been fulfilled, one is unverifiable, six are in progress (two behind schedule), and one has been partially fulfilled. The main outcome is **the strategic framework**: the

“Sport 2030” program and the new

Regulations for Sports Schools, the latter lacking the promised funding formula. Several commitments are not even included in the adopted program: the Olympic training center in Hîrbovăț, “Invest in the Coach,” and the sports voucher. **Funding and infrastructure** have increased in specific areas, but without a consolidated record showing progress toward 1 billion lei annually or 600 million lei for infrastructure. The most glaring shortfall concerns **salaries**: coaches, sports school directors, and sports physicians have not received targeted pay raises, and the new salary law has been postponed until 2027. The “**Sport for All**” component remains virtually untouched: the daily physical activity class, grants for clubs, Erasmus+ Sport, and the sports voucher have not been implemented.

Conclusion: *In sports, the first year produced policy documents but had almost no effect on salaries, mass sports, or the investments that were specifically promised.*

IX. Social Protection (Actions 203–236)

Of the 29 commitments evaluated, 19 are in progress (five behind schedule), two are partially achieved, one is formally achieved, and seven have not been achieved. The minimum wage has increased from 5,500 to **6,300 lei** as of 2026, and the projected average wage is **17,400 lei**, far from the targets of 10,000 and 25,000 lei. **Pensions** have been indexed by 6.84% since April 2026, but the increase remains insufficient relative to inflation, which is why the commitment is considered fulfilled only formally. The most solid results are in **pension agreements** (the agreement with Italy, effective in September 2025; new agreements with Ukraine and Switzerland; and the ratification of the agreement with Slovakia) and in **daycare centers**, where the program's budget has increased from 18 to 385 million lei for 2026–2027, with a target of over 5,000 new spots. Also adopted were the elimination of the marriage requirement for maternity benefits, the e-Zilier platform, and a package of 14 resolutions for the reorganization of social services; the target of 25,000 people employed with support in 2026 aligns with the pace needed to reach 100,000 in four years.

The following have not yet been implemented: the pension supplement for people born before 1945, the “Mobility for Dignity” and “After 16,” the program for families with three or more children, the increase in subsidies for people with disabilities employed in specialized enterprises, educational materials for young parents, and the doubling of the number of senior students.

Conclusion: *Social protection has made measurable progress in childcare, pension arrangements, and employment, but none of the new programs promised for the elderly, large families, and people with disabilities have been implemented.*

X. Health (Actions 237–265)

Of 29 commitments, two have been fulfilled, 24 are in progress (seven of which are well behind schedule), and three have not been fulfilled. Real progress has been made in **digitization** (the 2025–2030 Health Digitization and Innovation Program, the Electronic Health Record, the integration of e-prescriptions and registries, and the ERUSS human resources system) and in **screening and prevention**: cervical screening has been expanded to include HPV testing and electronic notification, and programs for mental health, vaccination, and combating antimicrobial resistance are continuing. **Assisted human reproduction** (IVF funded through mandatory insurance, with new services contracted by the National Health Insurance Company [CNAM] in 2026) and **the biobank** are up and running. Regional hospitals in Bălți and Cahul, **medical rehabilitation** (several district hospitals are still in the design phase), subsidized **dental services** for retirees and people with disabilities, and **medical staff salaries**—whose reform was postponed to January 1,

January 2027. The telemedicine law, the law on the quality of medical care, and the University Hospital remain unimplemented.

Conclusion: *In the health sector, reforms are underway and some concrete results have been achieved, but the promises most relevant to citizens (doctors' salaries, subsidized dental care, and rehabilitation) have fallen behind.*

XI. Justice (Actions 266–269)

None of the four commitments has been fulfilled: three are ongoing, all well behind schedule, and one has not been implemented. **Vetting** is the only process with quantifiable results: of the 204 individuals notified, 114 were removed from the system—44 failed to pass and 70 resigned or withdrew—and only 70 were confirmed, representing 34% of those notified; 16 cases remained pending, 13 of which were before the anti-corruption panels of the Chişinău District Court, where no evaluation had been completed as of August 21, 2026. **The vetting of prosecutors** is the major outstanding issue: out of 131 candidates, 30 passed, 4 failed, and 85 are listed with no result, and at the PCCOCS, 63 out of 64 prosecutors had not been evaluated—98.4% of the targeted staff—nearly three years after the process began and precisely within the institution whose powers were restricted by the law of June 11, 2026.

Trial of corruption cases: the anti-corruption judicial framework had been established prior to the reference period (the law was passed in its second reading on July 3, 2025), and its implementation has been delayed—after four successive competitive selection processes, no judge has been appointed to the Central Court of Appeals, and the 15 positions at the Anti-Corruption College have been re-advertised twice in three months; the only new legislative change during this period—the redistribution of powers among the CNA, PA, and PCCOCS—was adopted against the express opposition of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, which warned that it would have “the opposite effect of the intended goal.” Regarding **the recovery of criminal assets**, “fundamental reform” boiled down to the transposition of a European directive initiated before the campaign: civil forfeiture remained at the conceptual stage, the institutional component disappeared when it was incorporated into the government's program, and the state reports seizures rather than recoveries—192 million lei seized compared to 11 million actually recovered by 2025. Ten months after taking office, **the reform of the admission process for judges and prosecutors** and the National Institute of Justice's (INJ) training program were still at the stage of a working group having been established (July 23, 2026), and the only legislative amendment adopted does not reform admission but rather lowers the threshold for graduation from the INJ.

Conclusion: *The justice system has only one measurable result—the vetting of judges, which is nearly complete—while the vetting of prosecutors, the adjudication of corruption cases, and the recovery of criminal assets remain, one year later, either stalled or reduced to mere formalities.*

XII. Culture (Actions 270–277)

Of eight commitments, one has been fulfilled, three are in progress (two behind schedule and one significantly behind schedule), and four remain unfulfilled. **Cultural diplomacy** has been achieved: the Republic of Moldova participated for the first time with a national pavilion at the Venice Biennale, was present at the Leipzig Book Fair with four authors whose works have been translated into German, joined the “Creative Europe” program, and launched the competition for the title of European Capital of Culture 2033. **The cultural voucher** was extended to young people aged 16 and older, but not to seniors. For **cultural heritage**, the special fund has existed since 2024, and restorations during that period (four monuments) were funded by the EU; the “Book Program 2024–2030” does not exist as a separate document. The Ministry of Culture's budget exceeded one billion lei for the first time, but

were the additional funding for **children's theaters**, the national **arts education** programs (the budget for the "Access to Culture" program dropped from 50 to 15 million lei), the construction **of the Philharmonic** (with no solution, site, or funding), and the new **AMTAP** academic building.

Conclusion: *Culture has gained international visibility and a record budget, but none of the promised investments have been initiated.*

XIII. Agriculture (actions 278–288)

Of 11 commitments, one has been fulfilled, and ten are in progress, of which five are well behind schedule and three are behind schedule. The only commitment that has been fulfilled is **the requirement to indicate the country of origin** on food products in supermarkets. Of **the 2026 subsidy fund**, totaling approximately 2.33 billion lei, 1.36 billion had been paid out as of June 30, primarily for applications from 2023–2025, and as of mid-July, approximately 1.9 billion lei in obligations remained for the 2025 applications. The first call for proposals under **the new Strategic Agricultural Policy Program** was not announced until September 11, 2026, with no projects selected or payments made as of the date of the assessment. **The 30% threshold** for technology adoption and processing cannot be verified, in the absence of a separate budget line item. **Exports to the EU** increased by 12.7% in the first half of 2026, and poultry meat was authorized for export, but there are no separate data on Moldovan finished products or brands on European store shelves. Approved **irrigation** projects cover approximately 4,900 ha (9.8% of the 50,000 ha target), and reform of the hail protection system has not been initiated.

Conclusion: *In agriculture, the first year established the framework and mobilized resources, but the funds were used primarily to cover prior obligations, and the promised structural transformation of agriculture cannot yet be demonstrated.*

XIV. Environment (Actions 289–299)

Of the 11 commitments, one has been fulfilled, nine are in progress (one making good progress, one behind schedule), and one cannot be verified. All six commitments in **the forestry sector** reflect the components of the Forest Development Program (2023–2028), funded by a 200-million-euro EIB loan ratified before the elections. During this period, Moldsilva launched a 94.9 million lei tender for new **forestry equipment**, and a feasibility study is being contracted for the three **industrial nurseries** and **the seed center**. Funding for the 30 **timber storage facilities** has been secured, but the facilities have not been built. **Afforestation** is proceeding at a slower-than-planned pace: the target for 2026 is 7,200 ha, compared to the approximately 15,000 ha needed annually to reach 60,000 ha. Regarding **waste management**, none of the three zones that were supposed to be completed are ready (for Zone 5, contracts were signed as late as August 2026, with a completion date in 2028), and in Zones 2, 4, and 7, work has not yet begun. The reclamation **of the more than 300 landfills** cannot be verified: the 2026 campaign cleaned up 1,103 sites, which does not equate to the promised reclamation and reforestation.

Conclusion: *Environmental progress is being driven by externally funded projects contracted before the current administration took office; tangible results (planted forests, waste infrastructure, landfills) are still far from the stated targets.*

XV. National Reintegration (Actions 300–302)

All three commitments are ongoing, with two showing good progress. The government has maintained an active institutional process: in 2026, **30 projects** were approved and funded **in localities within the Security Zone**

Security Zone, and dialogue continued in the parliamentary forum and within the OSCE framework. The result is **gradual administrative and economic reintegration**; the status of the Transnistrian region has not been resolved, though no realistic timeline for this existed in the first year.

Conclusion: *There are projects, funding, and dialogue for reintegration, but the strategic outcome—the effective reintegration of the country—remains to be achieved.*

XVI. Energy (Actions 303–314)

Of the 12 commitments, 11 are underway, and one has not been implemented: stabilizing natural gas and electricity prices through long-term contracts. The most significant progress concerns **renewables and the market**: installed capacity from renewable sources exceeded 1,039 MW in March 2026, the energy exchange has been operational since December 2025, and gas security reserves have been increased to 56.3 million m³. Regarding **interconnections**, the Vulcănești–Chișinău line has entered the testing phase, the contract for the Bălți–Suceava line was signed on June 26, 2026, and the Strășeni–Gutinaș project has not yet been initiated. Battery storage has moved to the bidding and contractual obligations stage, with no capacity yet operational. **The new power plants** have not yet been commissioned: the 55 MW plant is in the procurement phase, and the 250 MW plant is in the technical preparation phase. Regarding **energy efficiency**, the promised thermal insulation program had already been launched in 2024, but progress is slow: by June 2026, four contracts for apartment buildings had been signed and 42 rural homes completed, compared to the target of over 8,500 homes; the “Green House” program was accelerated, while EcoVoucher slowed down. The system for comparing supplier offers was still in the public consultation phase.

Conclusion: *The energy sector is making real progress in the market, in renewables, and in interconnection, but new power plants and energy efficiency remain at the project stage or are advancing at a pace incompatible with the targets.*

XVII. Foreign Policy (Actions 315–318)

All four commitments are ongoing. The main result is progress **toward EU accession**: following the completion of the bilateral screening in 2025, on **June 15, 2026**, the Republic of Moldova opened the “Fundamentals” cluster, and in July, cluster 6, “External Relations.” Efforts continued to strengthen bilateral partnerships, participate in multilateral forums, and conduct diplomatic activities on behalf of the diaspora. However, the opening of negotiations does not mean that the criteria have been met: for the “Fundamentals,” justice, the fight against corruption, and the effective implementation of European legislation remain essential conditions.

Conclusion: *Foreign policy has a clear strategic goal—the transition to accession negotiations—but performance must be measured by the quality of reforms, not by the number of clusters opened.*

XVIII. Chișinău and Urban Development (Actions 319–328)

Of 10 commitments, eight are underway (one behind schedule), one has not been implemented, and one is unverifiable. The greatest progress relates to **approved portfolios**: the “European Courtyard” program received funding for an additional 380 projects (over 1.7 billion lei), exceeding the target of 250 courtyards, but by August 2026, only about 15 had been completed. **HighTech Park Stăuceni** has been designated an industrial park and has a master plan, but physical investments are planned for later phases, and the specialized parks (food industry, biomedicine, electronics) have not yet been

launched. **The Chişinău Beltway** is in the feasibility study phase, with construction estimated to begin in 2027. The **district heating** project (2,510 heating points, 57 thermally insulated apartment buildings) replicates the metrics of a project launched before the elections

and has yet to yield tangible results. Investments in **model schools, kindergartens, and dormitories** have begun, but they fall far short of the targets of over 1 billion lei for 25 schools and 600 million lei for 15 dormitories; the 100 million lei threshold for kindergartens is being met primarily through external financing secured by the city government. No government procurement has been identified for the **100 transportation units**, and the joint Government–local public administration program for **dog population control** does not exist.

Conclusion: *Projects and funding have been approved for Chişinău, but tangible results are few, and some of the achievements are attributable to the municipality or to projects predating the current term of office.*

XIX. Modernization of Public Services (Actions 329–336)

Of eight commitments, seven are underway and one is well behind schedule. **Digitization** is progressing: 445 out of 636 public services (about 70%) were digitized by August 2026, the EVO portal was launched in January 2026, and EVO 2.0 added the digital identity wallet. However, the targets remain far off: approximately 85,000 authenticated EVO users compared to the promised 1 million, and the claim that 1.5 million citizens hold an electronic signature has not been substantiated. **Prices for digital services** have fallen only in certain segments (about 10% for some civil registry services), while the cost of passports and driver’s licenses has risen. Municipal **mergers** have accelerated: the incentive was tripled to 3,000 lei per resident, and 561 municipalities had final merger decisions, although the process was accompanied by reports of pressure and insufficient consultation. **Recruitment** with a centralized written exam is still in the pilot phase; the authority for large infrastructure projects (“Moldova-Proiect”) was established in 2024; and the increase in the co-financing fund for local projects cannot be substantiated.

Conclusion: *The modernization of public services is steadily progressing, but the numerical targets (100% digitization, 1.5 million electronic signatures, 1 million EVO users) have not yet been met.*

8. Key Figures

8.1. Breakdown by Level of Completion

Level of completion	Number	Percentage
Achieved	18	5.5%
Almost achieved	1	0.3%
Partially achieved	5	1.5%
Formally achieved	2	0.6%
In progress — good progress	13	4.0%
In progress	140	43.1%

Degree of completion	Number	Share
In progress — behind schedule	39	12.0%
In progress — significantly behind schedule	47	14.5%
Not achieved	56	17.2%
Needs verification	3	0.9%
Unverifiable	1	0.3%
TOTAL	325	100%

Four figures sum up the year. **18 of 325 sectoral commitments—5.5%—have been fully implemented.** Adding partial achievements, formal ones, and those “nearly achieved,” the total reaches 26 items, or 8.0%. **56 commitments—17.2%—have not even begun to be implemented. 86 commitments—26.5%—have begun but are progressing slower than needed to meet the target,** 47 of which are far behind schedule. The remainder—153 items (47.1%)—are underway with no demonstrable delay, and four cannot be classified based on public sources.

It is important to note: “in progress” does not mean “unfulfilled,” and the high proportion of this category one year into a four-year term is normal and expected. **The cause for concern is not the 47.1% figure itself, but the ratio between it and the two adjacent figures: for every commitment fully implemented, there are more than three commitments that have not even begun and nearly five that are progressing more slowly than they should.**

8.2. What Predicts Implementation: The Form of the Commitment

We cross-referenced the degree of fulfillment with the type of commitment, classified mechanically based on the wording. The result is the most useful statistical finding in this report.

Type of Commitment	Total	Completed*	In Progress	Behind Schedule	Not completed	Unverified
Quantified or with a term	114	6	50	40	14	4
Standard	11	2	4	2	3	0
Intent	51	3	27	13	8	0
Trial	149	15	72	31	31	0
TOTAL	325	26	153	86	56	4

* Fully, partially, or formally implemented.

Regulatory commitments—those implemented through the adoption of a legislative act—have the highest rate of full implementation relative to their number: 2 out of 11. **Quantified or time-bound** commitments are the most vulnerable to delays: 40 out of 114—more than one-third—are progressing slower than required, precisely because they have a specific target against which progress can be measured. **Process-based** commitments account for the highest absolute number of unfulfilled items—31—but also the highest number of fulfilled items, 15, confirming that this category is heterogeneous. Meanwhile, commitments **of intent** are concentrated in a category from which there is no way out: more than half of them—27 out of 51

— are listed as “in progress,” without a demonstrable gap, because a verb that does not commit to a result cannot generate a measurable gap. This is the largest proportion in the table.

This leads to a rule that we have verified item by item and which we formulate as a reading guide for the second year: **a commitment is fulfilled when it continues an already institutionalized administrative process and is executed through an act that the authority can issue on its own. A commitment is not fulfilled when it involves a new political decision, a new regulation, or new funding.** Inclusion in the government’s program is a necessary but not sufficient condition: the reform of the process for entering the judicial profession was included almost verbatim and still has not moved forward.

8.3. The Most Significant Failures

Not all unfulfilled commitments carry the same weight. We have selected the ten that we consider the most serious—based on their impact on citizens, not on the prominence of the issue—and have indicated, for each one, exactly what is missing.

1. Salaries in education, research, and healthcare—the year’s most significant unfulfilled pledge

The program promised that the average salary in education and research would be “at least equal to the average salary across the economy.” In the second quarter of 2026, the average gross salary across the economy was 16,895.7 lei, while the average in education was 13,810.5 lei—a gap of approximately 18%. Along with this commitment, the following remained unfulfilled: a base salary at least equal to the economy-wide average for researchers and faculty, an increase in hourly pay to the standard rate, free meals for faculty, and “Prima Casă” housing benefits for young professors and researchers. The latter deserves a separate mention: not only was the additional benefit not created, but the program under which it was supposed to be implemented was scaled back as of April 1, 2026. This is the only case in this group where developments moved in the opposite direction of the commitment.

Healthcare workers’ salaries—the promised increase has been pushed back to 2027. The commitment was explicit: a continuous increase in healthcare workers’ salaries. In the first year of the term, however, a structural pay increase adopted by the current administration did not take effect. The pay reform, initially announced for September 1, 2026, was postponed to January 1, 2027, and the government acknowledged that the original deadline could no longer be met.

2. Pensions — Steady Growth, but Below Inflation

The commitment to ensure that “minimum and average pensions grow steadily” has, formally, been fulfilled: the indexations have taken place. However, we have classified it as **formally achieved** because evaluating an increase in income without reference to inflation is meaningless. The increase was insufficient relative to official inflation—5.81% during the reference period, with the base rate rising from 5.0% to 6.50% on May 7, 2026—and even more so relative to the price increases felt in the daily shopping basket. The commitment regarding the pension supplement for people born before 1945, intended to correct a historical injustice, has not resulted in any draft legislation. The cumulative effect of these two measures, together with the wage increases in education, is: marginal growth in real incomes during a year of inflation.

3. Justice — the framework is in place, but the results are not

Of the four commitments in the Justice chapter, none has been fulfilled. The vetting process has yielded certain results, some of which have been strongly contested by the expert community; these suspicions have been fueled by questionable government decisions, such as the amendment of the law (generically referred to as the “VonHebel Law”) in violation of all transparency procedures and to favor a specific individual. At the same time, the vetting of prosecutors is proceeding slowly, far below the required pace, and the evaluation committee’s decisions to reject certain candidates are being overturned by the Superior Council of the Magistracy (CSP) (currently 7 out of 12). The reform of the process for entering the professions of judge and prosecutor—explicitly required by the European Commission and incorporated almost verbatim into the government’s program—has made no progress whatsoever to date.

4. Meritocracy and Hiring in Public Service

The exact commitment in the program reads as follows: “We will encourage the implementation of merit-based standards for hiring and promotion in central government agencies and public institutions. We will centralize the written portion of the competitive examination for all central government agencies, so that public service becomes more accessible.” While, on a technical level, the State Chancellery has carried out certain preparatory activities for the launch of a new type of recruitment process for public institutions, these efforts have been undermined by the practice of non-transparent hiring based on family ties or party affiliation, which has been highlighted in the public sphere recently.

5. The Growth Plan’s 1.9 billion euros—funding secured, infrastructure still lagging

Nine out of ten actions under this chapter are progressing well below the required pace. The Chişinău Intermodal Terminal has not yet reached the construction phase, and the Bereşti Multimodal Logistics Complex is in the preparation and procurement stages for infrastructure design. On the railways, the Căinari–Fălcui project aims to rehabilitate approximately 100 km by 2027 and has achieved its first concrete result, but it is still far from the overall goal. The capital’s beltway is also progressing in stages, with one section already completed and others in the technical and financial preparation phase.

This is the area where the gap between mobilized funding, public announcements, and the infrastructure actually delivered is particularly evident. And the problems are not limited to pace: the Court of Auditors’ audit identified deficiencies in the implementation of the “European Village” program, which also raises concerns about the quality and compliance of the work.

In infrastructure, funding and the contract are just the beginning. The result is measured in kilometers

built, completed projects, and infrastructure actually put into operation.

6. Roads — 7% per year of a five-year target

The target of 3,000 km by 2029 requires approximately 600 km per year. In 2025, 206 km were repaired, of which only 15.39 km were major repairs; for 2026, approximately 210 km of regional routes were planned. The minister in charge stated that over 50% of the roads are in poor condition. Added to this are the 200 km of local roads promised for the first 100 days, for which there is no consolidated public data—we cannot say they were not built, but neither can the public say they were.

7. “Water for All”—a Thirteen-Year Commitment

With 69.1% of localities connected, approximately 472 out of about 1,527 remain outside the public water networks. The pace since 2025 has been an increase of 36 localities per year. At this rate, connecting all localities would take approximately thirteen years. The commitment does not specify a deadline, which makes it impossible to formally refute—but the math places it well beyond the term for which it was undertaken.

8. Housing—no tools, no strategy

Three distinct commitments, all unfulfilled. Stimulating the construction of at least 25,000 housing units around the Chișinău metropolitan area would have required the suburban ring to build, on its own, more each year than the entire country built in 2025—a year in which the number of housing units commissioned reached its lowest level in recent years. There is no dedicated program for additional funding of electricity, water, and sewer networks outside Chișinău. And the National Housing Strategy, which was supposed to provide coherence to the other two, shows no evidence of having been drafted, subject to public consultation, or approved. In a country with high emigration, the absence of a housing policy is not a technical oversight.

9. Sports—Half a Chapter with No Implementation

Fourteen out of twenty-two commitments remain unfulfilled, one is unverifiable, and none has been fully implemented. The Olympic sports complex in Hîrbovăț and the renovation of the Track and Field Stadium do not appear in the Implementation Program for the “Sport 2030” Strategy for 2026–2028. The “Invest in Coaches” does not appear in any legislation or policy document. The “Sports Voucher” pilot program, included in the government’s agenda, has not been launched. Coaches’ pay grades have not been raised because the vehicle for this—the new pay law—was postponed by four months. The 10 million lei from Erasmus+Sport could not be secured: the Republic of Moldova was not an associated country in the program as of September 28, 2026.

10. Culture—a growing budget, but projects not yet started

The Ministry of Culture’s budget has increased from 743 million to over one billion lei. Six years after the fire, the “Serghei Lunchevici” National Philharmonic still lacks a final solution, a confirmed location, or signed funding. The new academic building for the Academy of Music, Theater, and Fine Arts has no design, feasibility study, land, or budget allocation. Additional funding for children’s theaters cannot be identified as a separate budget line item. National arts education programs do not appear in the strategic documents adopted during the monitoring period. An increase in a sector’s budget allocation does not equate to the fulfillment of commitments made in that sector—this is one of the distinctions that this report systematically highlights.

11. Health: Medical Rehabilitation—The Project Exists, but Hospitals Are Still Waiting for Infrastructure

The commitment called for the development of rehabilitation services through the reconstruction and equipping of facilities and the training of staff in all district hospitals. The World Bank-funded project is active, has a budget of over \$51 million, and includes precisely these components: infrastructure, equipment, and multidisciplinary teams. The problem is the pace of implementation: in 2026, the Ministry is still launching procurements for the design, cost estimation, and supervision of construction work in hospitals such as Hîncești, Căușeni, Călărași, Leova, Strășeni, Bălți, Edineț, Rezina, Șoldănești, and Telenești.

This is not an unfulfilled commitment—the project is underway—but for a goal that covers all district hospitals, after the first year, the physical progress is still far behind the final target.

Commitments That Cost Nothing

The hardest category to explain. The automatic granting of the second teaching rank to teachers with academic titles was carried out by ministerial order, at no cost to the budget and without a parliamentary vote—and the relevant regulation was substantially amended during the same period, without this provision being included. Opening direct access for schools to the “European Village” program required an amendment to the applicant’s guide, which remained unchanged: eligible applicants are still exclusively first-level local public authorities. Pre-filled tax returns for SMEs were not launched, even though the pre-filling feature has been available for individuals since February 2021. In these cases, the authorities have not publicly cited any budgetary or legislative obstacles. In the absence of such explanations, the failure to fulfill this commitment indicates a problem of priority and administrative decision-making.

8.4. Achievements That Matter

1. Launch of the first rounds of negotiations with the European Union

On June 15, 2026, the Republic of Moldova opened the first negotiation clusters with the EU—“Fundamentals” and “External Relations,” which include justice and fundamental rights, justice and security, public procurement, statistics and financial control, and, of course, external relations. This milestone followed the completion of the bilateral screening process and the adoption of roadmaps for the fundamental areas.

This is one of the most significant achievements of this period, as the accession process has moved from the preparatory stage to the actual negotiation of areas essential to the functioning of the state. Furthermore, the EU notes that the “Fundamentals” cluster is the first to be opened and the last to be closed, and progress in this cluster will determine the overall pace of the negotiations.

However, the opening of negotiations does not mean that the accession criteria have been met. The EU has already established interim benchmarks and conditions for the provisional closure of chapters, and monitoring of legislative alignment and the implementation of the European acquis will continue throughout the negotiations.

That is why the real challenge is just beginning: it is not merely a matter of how quickly the clusters are opened, but how well the alignment of national legislation with the

. What matters here is not only the quality of the legislation adopted, but also the transparency of the process and the institutions' capacity to effectively enforce the new rules.

The opening of Cluster 1 is, without a doubt, a major achievement. But the opening of negotiations is the beginning of the test, not the end of it.

2. Education — a set of concrete and verifiable results

Twelve commitments fully implemented and six showing good progress, including: a 50% increase in scholarships for students in STEAM and education sciences, effective September 1, 2026; the national bullying prevention program, approved by MEC Order No. 688 of March 27, 2026, and launched in 43 schools; the eduresurse.md platform, offering free interactive digital textbooks, launched in February 2026; the new funding formula for early childhood education institutions, approved on October 1, 2025, and implemented nationwide starting in 2026; a change in the weighting criteria for textbook selection—90% quality, 10% price; certification of national evaluators, with over 950 teachers trained, and a 40% increase in their pay for middle school and a 30% increase for high school graduation exams; the opportunity for non-native-language teachers with a C1 certificate to apply for teaching certification ahead of schedule; bilingual preschool groups, in Gagauz and Romanian, in the three district centers of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia.

3. VAT Registration Threshold — Threshold Exceeded

The threshold was raised from 1.2 to 1.5 million lei as of January 1, 2026, and, by a vote on February 19, 2026, to 1.7 million lei as of March 1, 2026. The additional increase to 3.2 million, proposed in Parliament, was rejected as incompatible with Directive 2006/112/EC—an example of an external limit being respected, which is worth noting as such.

4. Deduction for Education and Professional Development Expenses

Effective January 1, 2026, a deduction of up to 20,000 lei annually applies to education expenses, cumulatively for all types of expenses and for all beneficiaries, including children's education (Law No. 318/2025). Previously, only the portion for children was deductible, capped at the average monthly salary. The commitment was not only fulfilled but also expanded beyond the original wording.

5. Bilateral Pension Agreements

The area showing the most significant progress in the social protection chapter. The agreement with Italy took effect on September 1, 2025; agreements were signed with Ukraine and the Swiss Confederation; the Government approved the ratification of the agreement with the Slovak Republic; and the National Health Insurance House (CNAS) is negotiating with five additional countries. For citizens who have worked in these countries, the effect is direct and quantifiable.

6. The 400-kV power interconnection with Romania

The Vulcănești–Chișinău line, approximately 157 km long, was structurally completed in November 2025, and work on the Vulcănești Substation was also completed in 2026. The line itself was tested and energized up to the Chișinău Substation, but the entire project had not yet been put into commercial operation as of the evaluation date, as further testing and the repair of some malfunctions at the Chișinău Substation were still required. It is one of the few projects under the Growth Plan that has reached the stage of physically constructed and tested infrastructure, with a direct impact on energy security: once fully operational, it will enable the transmission of energy from Romania and the

European market without passing through the MGRES energy hub.

7. Courtyards in Chișinău

On November 26, 2025, 25 days after the government took office, another 380 courtyards were included in the unified investment program for 2025–2027, bringing the “European Courtyard” program to 469 courtyards and a total value of over 1.7 billion lei from the National Fund for Regional and Local Development. The 100-day commitment called for 100 courtyards. The challenge for the coming period will be the effective implementation of these projects.

8. Maternity Benefits, Decoupled from Marital Status

The government has eliminated the requirement that maternity benefits be contingent on the parents’ marital status, explicitly citing fairness, and periods of maternity and paternity leave are now recognized in pension calculations. This is a fairness adjustment with low administrative costs and an immediate impact on a specific group.

9. Cultural Diplomacy

During the period under review, the Republic of Moldova participated for the first time in history with a national pavilion at the Venice Art Biennale, was present at the Leipzig Book Fair with four authors whose works were translated into German using public funds, joined the “Creative Europe” program, and participated in the VOLTA Basel international art fair. This was the only fully realized achievement in the Culture chapter—and one achieved with modest resources.

8.5. How do we interpret these two lists together?

Placed side by side, the two lists reveal a pattern, not a coincidence. **The achievements are concentrated where the administration could decide on its own, quickly, and without significant cost**—a ministerial order, a government decision, an amendment to the Tax Code, or international participation. **The failures are concentrated where a new budget line item, a physical construction project, or a political decision that no one made was needed**—salaries, hospitals, housing, sports and cultural infrastructure, and the operationalization of the anti-corruption justice system.

This distribution has a direct impact on how the second year should be interpreted. The “easy” commitments were, for the most part, fulfilled in the first year. What remains for the next three years is mostly from the category that saw no progress at all in the first year.

One final clarification, applicable to the entire second part. The figures above measure the implementation of commitments, not the state of the country. They do not, on their own, explain the social and economic indicators presented in Sections 10 and 11 and should not be read as a causal explanation for them. The relationship between the two is real, but more complicated than a table can convey—and the report does not claim more than it can demonstrate.

PART III. WHAT HAPPENED WITHOUT BEING PROMISED

9. Measures Without an Electoral Mandate

An election platform is an offer. A vote cast on that basis authorizes what was announced, not everything that follows. This section examines the decisions adopted during the first year of the term that do not appear in any of the reference documents—the campaign platform and the roadmaps—or that, although they do appear, were implemented in a form substantially different from what was announced.

A good reform adopted without a mandate remains a good reform; but citizens have the right to know that their vote did not cover it. And when the measure restricts a democratic guarantee, the absence of a mandate is no longer a procedural observation but a matter of legitimacy.

We have identified five cases. We present them in the same format: what was adopted, through what procedure, what was publicly stated, and how it relates to the commitments made.

9.1. Code on the Organization and Functioning of Parliament

The adoption of a Parliamentary Code is not included in the PAS electoral platform. However, it is included in the Roadmap on “The Functioning of Democratic Institutions,” approved by Government Decision No. 276/2025, as Action 4.1, with a deadline of July 2025. The action did not call for just any code, but rather a code that would regulate, among other things, “safeguards against the abusive use of the emergency procedure when reviewing draft legislation,” the working methods of investigative committees, and the dialogue between the majority and the opposition.

The code was passed in its second reading during the plenary session on August 24, 2026, with 52 votes in favor.

The adopted text contains elements that I have publicly supported: “Government Hour,” with monthly ministerial debates on specific topics; “Opposition Day,” with priority consideration of the opposition’s initiatives; and an annual legislative program aligned with accession priorities. However, it also contains three provisions that run counter to Action 4.1:

- the decision on the emergency procedure is transferred from the Standing Bureau—a collegial body in which the opposition is also represented—to the Speaker of Parliament, by resolution. The action called for additional safeguards against the abuse of the emergency procedure; the act intended to implement it restricts the existing safeguard;
- the speaking time in plenary is reduced from seven to five minutes for parliamentary groups and from five to three minutes for members of Parliament;
- the public nature of committee meetings is eliminated, so that the participation of interested parties in committee meetings is no longer a right but a decision left to the discretion of the committee chair;
- Members of Parliament who leave a caucus may not form a new one and may not participate in the administrative structures governing the work of Parliament.

Procedurally, an amendment by MP R. Marian, submitted on June 25, 2026, eliminated the possibility of presenting verbal recommendations during public consultations organized by parliamentary committees and the committees’ obligation to record them (Promo-LEX and 45 organizations, public appeal).

At the same time, a new code should have introduced better provisions. However, some provisions—absolutely essential for a democratic process—were not included in the draft, even though they had been explicitly proposed by civil society. These include: a minimum timeframe for publishing the agenda of plenary sessions; a minimum interval of 3 days between the approval of a bill in its second reading by the reporting committee and its consideration in plenary, ensuring that the summary and the final draft are published well in advance of the plenary session.

9.2. Amendment of the Electoral Code by Law No. 192 of August 25, 2026

The PAS election platform contains no commitment to amend the Electoral Code. The government program contains no such commitment. Roadmap No. 276 contains two relevant actions—1.1 and 1.6—both with a deadline of December 2027 and both with specific content, which the adopted law covers only partially.

Some amendments with a direct impact on electoral rights were introduced and adopted after the public consultation had ended, without a new consultation and without the timely publication of the consolidated text. The public was invited to review a version of the draft, and important provisions were introduced or rewritten prior to the vote.

Among the amendments introduced in this manner that affect the conditions of competition:

- In Article 137, the deadline by which candidates for the office of President of the Republic of Moldova may be nominated is changed from 40 to 55 days before the election. Since the nomination period begins 70 days before the election, the available timeframe is reduced from 30 to 15 days. The requirement in Article 139(1) remains unchanged: at least 15,000 and no more than 25,000 signatures, collected from at least half of the second-level administrative-territorial units;
- In Article 102(4), the maximum duration of the restrictive measure is extended from one year to four years—that is, for the duration of a full electoral cycle—and paragraph (5) is supplemented with subparagraph (i), which adds among the grounds “meeting the conditions for being classified as a disguised independent candidate or the existence of disguised support for an electoral competitor”;
- in Article 91, paragraph (12), the Central Election Commission is granted the authority to examine ex officio the legality of the acts, actions, and omissions of lower-level electoral bodies, without a specific statute of limitations, without the obligation to hold a hearing, and without a defined standard of proof;
- for the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia: a new appeal mechanism (Article 97, paragraph (2¹), Article 98, Article 155, paragraph (4)), new eligibility requirements (Article 161, paragraphs (3)–(4): 21 years of age and 3 years of residence for a deputy in the People’s Assembly; 35 years of age, 10 years of residence, and proficiency in the Gagauz and Romanian languages for the Governor), a new formula for determining the number of deputies (Art. 156, para. (2¹)), and the transition to a proportional system in a single constituency (Art. 157, para. (1¹), Art. 172, para. (2)).

These amendments were not explicitly presented in the 2025 election platform, and those concerning Gagauz autonomy were not preceded by a distinct and sufficient process of institutional consultation with the authorities of the autonomous region.

9.3. Limited Public Consultation

This case warrants a precise presentation, as it consists of two halves that cancel each other out, and an account that would focus on only one of them would be misleading.

The first aspect. The draft law on public participation in the decision-making process, drafted by the State Chancellery and approved by the Government, extends the consultation periods compared to Law No. 239/2008: a minimum of 10 working days at the initiation stage for legislative acts and 15 working days for policy documents; a minimum of 15 and 20 working days, respectively, after the draft is prepared. The law also introduces a citizens' initiative mechanism, through which citizens can propose the drafting of decisions in the public interest, effective January 1, 2028, and strengthens the role of the particip.gov.md and e-Democracy platforms. The general provisions are set to take effect on January 1, 2027.

Part Two. On August 24, 2026—one day before the final vote—an amendment by Deputy V. Grădinaru amended the bill as follows:

- to eliminate the possibility of presenting oral recommendations during public consultation meetings and the authority's obligation to record and review them (Art. 13, para. (1), subparagraph (b), Art. 13, para. (3), Art. 14, para. (12), subparagraph (d));
- to narrow the requirement to repeat the consultation: from the criterion of a 30% change to the text to the criterion—which is much broader in interpretation—of affecting the “content or effects” of the solutions.

The law was passed in its second reading on August 25, 2026, with 59 votes in favor. Forty-five civil society organizations—including Promo-LEX, Amnesty International Moldova, Transparency International Moldova, and the Soros Foundation Moldova — called on the President of the Republic of Moldova not to promulgate the law and on Parliament to return it for revision, citing its discriminatory effect on older adults, people with disabilities, rural residents, and those with low literacy levels, as well as its contradiction with the commitments in the roadmap.

On September 3, 2026, the bill was adopted by Parliament in its third reading. At this stage, the provisions of the amendment that eliminated the possibility of making verbal recommendations during public consultations were withdrawn, so they were retained in the final adopted version.

Viewed separately, each case can be explained. Viewed together, they describe a consistent procedural pattern that has nothing to do with the content of the policies, but rather with the way they are adopted:

- a draft is submitted for public consultation in one version;
- substantial amendments are submitted after the consultation period ends, sometimes just one day before the vote;
- the consolidated text is not published in time to be analyzed;
- the vote takes place; and objections raised earlier receive, at best, a general response in a summary.

Three laws adopted in the same week—the Parliamentary Code, the amendment to the Electoral Code, and the law on public participation—followed the same path. And in two of them, the very mechanism through which the public can raise objections was the subject of last-minute changes.

9.4. Fiscal Policy: Promised Predictability vs. Actual Pace

The PAS election platform contains two explicit commitments on this matter: “We will adopt tax changes (fiscal policy) no more frequently than once every two years” and “We will introduce a predictable fiscal calendar for the next four years, developed in consultation with the business community, civil society, and social partners.”

Timeline for the first year of the term:

1. December 2025 — the package of tax changes for 2026, effective January 1, 2026: the threshold for registering as a VAT payer increased from 1.2 to 1.5 million lei; a deduction for education and professional development expenses of up to 20,000 lei annually; other adjustments;
2. February 19, 2026 — Parliament votes in the second reading on a new amendment to the Tax Code, raising the VAT threshold from 1.5 to 1.7 million lei, effective March 1, 2026;
3. Summer 2026 — The draft fiscal and customs policy for 2027 is submitted for public consultation, and subsequently withdrawn and revised in response to public feedback;
4. September 8, 2026 — The government approves the draft fiscal and customs policy for 2027: the personal exemption increased from 29,700 to 40,020 lei annually, the dividend tax increased from 6% to 8%, a 12% VAT rate for the hospitality sector (HoReCa) instead of the 8% rate, excise taxes on tobacco products and diesel fuel increased by 20%, new excise taxes on sweetened beverages, with a direct budgetary impact estimated at approximately 5.1 billion lei.

Three rounds of tax changes in twelve months, one of which occurred less than two months after the previous one took effect. The commitment not to change the tax regime more than once every two years was not honored, and the predictable four-year tax calendar was not published.

9.5. Voluntary amalgamation: mandate exceeded, consultation ineffective

Municipal mergers have an electoral mandate, but on a different scale than what has been implemented. The PAS program promised to accelerate the process “so that another 100 municipal mergers would be completed over the next four years.” As of September 2, 2026, 561 municipalities—63% of the total—had adopted final decisions on voluntary amalgamation, and the reform aims to reduce the number of municipalities from approximately 889 to approximately 292 by 2027.

The two figures cannot be directly compared: a single merger may involve multiple municipalities. However, they show that the process has taken on the scale of a general restructuring of local government. This scale, as well as the accelerated timeline for implementation, were not explained to voters in the election platform.

Our objection concerns the consultation mechanism. Point 37 of the Methodology approved by Government Decision No. 925/2023 makes community consultation—including local referendums—merely advisory. The case of Baraboi, Donduşeni District, documented by the Movement in July 2026, illustrates the practical consequence: the local council voted in favor of an option previously rejected by the general assembly of citizens, without the citizens' vote having any legal effect.

A reform that changes the administrative affiliation of the locality where a person was born and pays taxes cannot, as the sole mechanism for expressing the will of the residents, rely on a procedure whose outcome is not binding on anyone.

The problem is not limited to the consultative nature of the community vote. In the absence of guarantees regarding the representation of small villages, the transparent allocation of investments, public assets, access to services, and fiscal decentralization, amalgamation may take decision-making away from citizens without strengthening local autonomy.

PART IV. WHERE WE ACTUALLY STAND

10. What Has Improved

This section highlights the achievements of the period that we consider to be genuine, verifiable, and significant

— regardless of whether or not they are accompanied by the objections we raise elsewhere in the report.

10.1. European integration: the first negotiation clusters opened

On June 16, 2026, the Republic of Moldova opened the first two clusters of accession negotiations: Cluster 1, “Fundamentals,” and Cluster 6, “External Relations.” This was preceded by the Enlargement Package of November 4, 2025, in which the European Commission noted that the country had completed the screening process and adopted the roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration, and democratic institutions, thereby fulfilling the conditions for opening three clusters.

10.2. The Labor Market and Incomes: Real Growth, but Modest

In the second quarter of 2026, according to the National Bureau of Statistics:

- the employed population stood at 859,300 people, with an employment rate of 45.0% (63.3% for the 20–64 age group);
- the unemployment rate was 7.3%—6.2% in urban areas, 8.5% in rural areas, and 19.6% among young people (ages 15–24);
- the average gross monthly wage was 16,895.7 lei, up 9.2% in nominal terms and 3.4% in real terms compared to the second quarter of 2025, as the average number of employees increased by 2.5%.

The national minimum wage was raised from 5,500 to 6,300 lei per month starting in 2026, and the projected average wage was raised from 16,100 to 17,400 lei.

Real income growth is a positive outcome in a year with above-target inflation. Its relation to the campaign pledge is discussed in Section 11.

10.3. Foreign Trade: A Recovery in Exports, but Not Yet a Demonstrated Structural Performance

In the first six months of 2026, merchandise exports totaled 1.65 billion euros, 12.5% more than in the same period of 2025. More significantly, exports of domestically produced goods rose by 16.4%, while re-exports declined slightly. The European Union’s share of total exports reached 64.2%.

This growth is a positive indicator, but it cannot, on its own, be presented as an achievement of the government. The year-over-year comparison also reflects the base effect, and a single half-year is not sufficient to demonstrate a structural change in export competitiveness. Furthermore,

the trade deficit remained very high: imports were nearly three times higher than exports, and the deficit exceeded 3.3 billion euros.

Therefore, the result can be noted as a favorable development, but not as an achievement of the government. For a solid assessment, it would be necessary to compare it with levels from 2020, 2021–2025, the growth in the physical volume of exports, productivity, and the structure of exported goods.

10.4. Tax Measures with a Direct Impact on Households and Small Businesses

- Effective January 1, 2026, a deduction of up to 20,000 lei per year applies to expenses for education and professional development, cumulatively across all types and beneficiaries, including children's education. Previously, only the portion for children was deductible, capped at the average monthly salary. This is one of the two actions on the 100-day list that have been fully implemented.
- The threshold for mandatory registration as a VAT payer has increased from 1.2 to 1.5 million lei as of January 1, 2026, and to 1.7 million lei as of March 1, 2026—exceeding the promised level.

10.5. Energy: Capacity, Interconnection, Independence

As of March 31, 2026, installed capacity from renewable sources exceeded 1,039 MW—solar 759.79 MW, wind 254.72 MW, hydro 16.75 MW, biogas 8.475 MW—representing a 13.2-fold increase over five years.

The Vulcănești–Chișinău power line entered the testing and energization phase in 2026, and on June 26, 2026, the contract for the construction of the 400-kV Bălți–Suceava line was signed. The line has not yet been put into operation, as the deadline has already been postponed five times.

We note, however, that the share of renewable energy in electricity consumption was 16.7% in 2024, with a projection of up to 27% for 2026, compared to the 30% target set in the election platform. Installed capacity and share of consumption are distinct indicators and should not be confused.

10.6. Education: Substantially Increased Scholarships in Priority Areas

By a government decision dated July 1, 2026, student scholarships were increased effective September 1, 2026, by at least 40% across all fields of study: Category I from 1,360 to 1,905 lei, and Category II from 1,160 to 1,625 lei. In health sciences, the increase is approximately 180% (Category I: from 1,630 to 4,565 lei), and in education sciences, 40% (Category I: from 3,260 to 4,565 lei). Merit-based scholarships increased by 40%.

10.7. Developments in the tourism sector

In the first half of 2026, the number of tourists staying in the Republic of Moldova increased by 15.8%, reaching 257,300, while the number of non-resident tourists staying in the country rose by 24.7%. Domestic tourism organized through travel agencies increased by 11.1%, and tourist and agritourism guesthouses welcomed 10.9% more tourists. However, the total number of overnight stays increased by only 4.6%, indicating that short stays remain the norm. Overall, the data show a positive trend in the sector, including rural tourism, but also highlight the need to capitalize more effectively on tourist flows.

11. What Has Worsened

This section has two parts, which should not be confused. The first covers indicators for which official data is available and which have deteriorated or remained at levels incompatible with the stated objectives. The second covers legal safeguards that were restricted by legislation adopted during the reference period.

An economic indicator may deteriorate due to external causes, and the government is not responsible for gas prices on international markets. A legal guarantee can only be restricted through a vote, and someone is accountable for that vote.

11.1. Indicators that have deteriorated

Population: down by 22,900 people in one year

As of January 1, 2026, the population with habitual residence was 2,365,600 people, down by 22,900 (-1.0%) compared to January 1, 2025. This decline has two components: negative natural increase (-10.0 thousand people in 2025) and negative net international migration (-13.0 thousand people, provisional estimate for 2025).

Migration therefore remains the main factor driving depopulation. It is the indicator that measures, better than any other, whether people believe the country is moving in a direction that matters to them.

Poverty: Nearly One-Third of the Population

In 2025, the absolute poverty rate stood at 31.1%, with a threshold of 3,764.4 lei per person per month. The distribution reveals profound territorial and social inequality:

- rural areas — 40.0%, compared to 21.1% in urban areas;
- Southern region — 46.5%; Central region — 38.8%; Northern region — 31.6%;
- people aged 60 and older — 38.9%;
- people with disabilities — 38.7%, 8.1 percentage points higher than the rest of the population;
- households with 5 or more people — 44.8%; households with 3 or more children — 41.5%.

Inflation: Above Target, with an Increase in the Base Rate

In August 2026, the annual inflation rate was 7%, above the National Bank's target of 5.0% (with a tolerance band of ± 1.5 percentage points). On May 7, 2026, the National Bank raised the base rate from 5.0% to 6.50% annually, and on September 17, it raised it to 9%. The factors cited are predominantly external: rising costs of fuel and energy resources, the geopolitical crisis, and second-round effects, with domestic demand having a disinflationary effect.

Real incomes: +3.4% per year, compared to a commitment to double them in four years

The second strategic objective of the electoral program is to “double the income of the working population.” In 2025, the average gross monthly wage was 15,594.5 lei, a nominal increase of 11.5% compared to 2024 and 3.4% in real terms, with an average annual inflation rate of 7.8%. When measured by the broader metric of disposable income, the real increase was only 1.2%.

The math is simple and requires no interpretation. At a real growth rate of 3.4% per year, it would take approximately twenty-one years to double incomes. To double real incomes in four years, a real growth rate of about 19% annually would be required—more than five times the recorded rate.

The same observation applies to nominal targets. The minimum wage has risen from 5,500 to 6,300 lei; the target is 10,000 lei. The projected average wage has risen from 16,100 to 17,400 lei; the target is 25,000 lei by 2030.

Administrative-Territorial Reform

Despite the fact that a large number of local authorities have adopted decisions on voluntary mergers and the authorities are preparing a draft law on mandatory mergers, this process is fraught with numerous flaws. Several localities have reported that the local council is not taking residents' opinions into account, and that the council's decision runs counter to the views expressed by citizens at the town hall meeting. Other localities, which, although they complied with the requirement and advanced in the voluntary merger process by completing all necessary steps, now face the situation where several other localities could be added to the cluster they formed, already through the decision on statutory merger.

Looking at the bigger picture, however, the entire reform is not based on a cost-benefit analysis or an economic, fiscal, and capacity assessment of the municipalities subject to amalgamation.

Scandals related to the authorities' inability to manage the situation/corruption/nepotism

During the monitoring period, the state was negatively affected by a series of issues that demonstrated, in some cases, the institutions' inability to effectively fulfill their duties, while in others—the perpetuation of long-standing practices of nepotism and corruption.

The “TUX” Ponzi scheme

(inability to supervise and take preventive action)

The platform collapsed on October 7, 2025, after attracting approximately 50,000 people, with estimated losses exceeding 48 million euros. It operated publicly—with seminars, trainers, and recruitment networks—and the CNPF issued repeated warnings throughout 2025 to no avail, because the platform was not registered and did not fall under its regulatory authority; In the first few days after the collapse, the police had received no complaints, and the head of the General Police Inspectorate (IGP) admitted that civil servants were among the victims. As of June 11, 2026, out of dozens of people under investigation, only one defendant had been indicted for illegal business activities and money laundering. The opposition's request to hold a plenary hearing with the leadership of the National Commission for Financial Protection (CNPF) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI) was rejected by a vote of 44—the state was unable to either prevent the scheme or publicly explain why it had failed to do so.

Smuggling of military weapons

(inability to control the border and transit flows)

A shipment of Ukrainian-origin weapons destined for Israel was intercepted at Leușeni-Albița: a portable air-to-ground missile launcher, eight RPG anti-tank launchers, 13 shipping containers, 18 laser-guided anti-tank systems, and a drone, declared at customs as “black-market metal items

” and concealed with materials that prevented scanning. Five men were indicted as members of an organized criminal group, with assigned roles—organizer, logistics coordinator, customs broker, exporter, and driver—with the shipments taking place in stages from 2023 through November 2025. The shipment crossed the country for more than two years without being stopped, and the scheme involved an intermediary licensed by the state itself to guarantee the legality of customs operations.

Telephone scams

(failure to protect citizens in the face of a widespread phenomenon)

Between May 20 and June 1, 2026—thirteen days—the police recorded 149 confirmed cases, 2,911 attempted scams, and losses totaling over 27.2 million lei, with a peak of 3.9 million in a single day. The perpetrators posed as employees of banks, the National Bank, the police, and intelligence services, while the state’s response remained, throughout the entire period, purely informational: press releases and calls for vigilance. The primary tool of the fraud was the impersonation of state institutions, and the burden of protection was shifted to the potential victim.

Police officers from the Botanica Police Station

(systematic corruption within the law enforcement agency)

In April 2026, the National Anti-Corruption Center (NAC) and the Chisinau Prosecutor’s Office detained six police officers suspected of systematically receiving between \$3,000 and \$10,000, in cash and cryptocurrency, from drug users and traffickers. In June, three of them were detained again, this time on charges of abuse of office—suspected of embezzling a portion of the money seized from individuals in their custody. This case does not describe an isolated incident, but rather a long-standing relationship between the agency tasked with combating drug trafficking and the trafficking itself; the second arrest shows that the misconduct continued even during the very proceedings initiated to punish them.

The MoldATSA Scandal

(nepotism, unjustified salaries, and failure of internal controls)

At the agency that manages the country’s airspace, a falsified resume belonging to Director Dumitru Vangheli was discovered, along with 33 hires made without competitive selection, flawed procurement, unjustified bonuses, and over 9 million lei spent on training in Thailand and Singapore; Spokesperson Anastasia Taburceanu, the President’s cousin, earned over 1 million lei in less than a year. A cascade of resignations followed—Vangheli, Taburceanu, the chief of staff to the Speaker of Parliament, a parliamentary committee chair, and the director of the Public Property Agency—along with a criminal investigation for abuse of office and the expansion of audits to 21 other state-owned enterprises. What is decisive, however, is not the scale of the irregularities, but the fact that no internal control mechanism detected them, and the response was focused on individuals rather than the system: the framework that made them possible—unregulated pay at state-owned enterprises and hiring without competitive selection—remained unchanged.

Repeated airspace violations

(inability to detect and respond in the security sector)

Drones have repeatedly entered the territory of the Republic of Moldova, with some crashing, yet detection and response have not visibly improved from one incident to the next. The institutional response has been limited to statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worded in nearly identical terms each time, and analysts argue that one of the purposes of these overflights is precisely to test the authorities’ response capacity.

In such a scenario, the lack of a response is not merely an administrative shortcoming, but the very outcome sought by the opposing side.

The Ludmila Vartic Case, the Măgdăcești Murder, and the Protection of Victims of Domestic Violence *(the failure of the protection mechanism to function when alerted)*

Ludmila Vartic, the wife of the former vice president of the Hâncești district, died on March 3, 2026; prosecutors filed two charges against her husband, including for prior incidents dating back to November 2025—which means the situation was known to the authorities before the tragedy occurred. Six months later, the case had not yet reached trial, and in September 2026, protests resumed in front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after a woman in Măgdăcești who had an active protection order was killed. The demand made by women's organizations concerns precisely the subject of this section: not the adoption of new regulations, but the guarantee that when a woman seeks help from the authorities, that help is provided.

Foreign Direct Investment: On the Decline

At the end of the first quarter of 2026, the stock of foreign direct investment stood at approximately 5.1 billion euros, down by 268 million euros (-5%) compared to the same period in 2025. Equity investments and reinvested earnings fell by 8%, and investments from the European Union—the main source—declined by 6.7% compared to the end of 2025.

Trade deficit: for every euro exported, three were imported

In the first half of 2026, exports totaled 1,650.5 million euros (+12.5%), while imports totaled 4,985.7 million euros (+6.5%). The trade deficit reached 3,335.2 million euros, up 3.7% compared to the same period in 2025.

The increase in exports is a positive development, as noted in Section 10. However, the structure of foreign trade remains unchanged: the degree to which exports cover imports is 33.1%.

National Debt: The government borrows at higher rates domestically than abroad

As of May 31, 2026, the national debt reached 143.09 billion lei—more than 10.3 billion lei higher than at the end of 2025, or about 37% of the projected GDP for 2026. The increase comes primarily from domestic sources: domestic debt rose to 58.2 billion lei as of August 31, 2026, up 6.21 billion (+11.9%) over eight months, at an average rate of approximately 776 million lei per month, fueled by net financing of 5.77 billion lei from government securities issuances on the primary market.

The cost of these loans is rising faster than any other category of public spending. In the first five months of 2026, debt service cost the budget 2.42 billion lei, 24.8% more than in the same period of 2025—compared to a 1.7% increase in personnel expenses and +11.4% for goods and services. The weighted average interest rate on government securities was 9.56% annually, 0.48 percentage points higher than in 2025.

There was also a reversal: although external debt accounts for 59.6% of the total, domestic debt costs more—1.72 billion lei in interest, compared to 705 million for external debt, in the first five months

of the year. In the first months of 2025, the ratio was reversed (354 million for domestic debt, 454 million for external debt). The explanation lies in price and maturity: domestic loans are taken out at about 9.5% annually, compared to the preferential interest rates offered by foreign creditors, and 95.8% of domestic government securities mature in less than one year—exceeding the 90% risk threshold assumed by the government. The second threshold exceeded is the share of debt with a variable interest rate, which has reached 61.1% compared to the 60% maximum.

The government is therefore borrowing at an accelerated pace, at rising costs, for increasingly shorter terms, and with ever-greater exposure to interest rate fluctuations. The resulting burden does not appear in any campaign pledge because it was not promised to anyone: it translates into resources that no longer reach investments, and is paid for out of taxes collected during the very same period in which taxpayers are being asked to help balance the budget.

Trust in Institutions and Perceptions of the Country’s Direction

According to the iData poll conducted between May 14 and 24, 2026 (992 respondents, margin of error 3.1%), Parliament and the Government rank at the bottom of the institutional trust rankings, with approximately 12% and 11% of respondents, respectively, expressing “very high” trust, while the church, local authorities, and the education system rank at the top.

According to the February 2026 IMAS poll (1,113 respondents, margin of error ±3%), 53% of respondents believe the country is heading in the wrong direction, compared to 38% who believe it is heading in the right direction.

Important notes. First: the two polls were conducted by different institutes using different methodologies and are not comparable. Second: the Public Opinion Barometer—the series with the longest methodological continuity in the Republic of Moldova—did not publish an edition during the reference period that would allow for a direct comparison with September 2025.

11.2. Legal safeguards that have been curtailed

Unlike the indicators mentioned above, the following elements do not depend on the external context. Each is the result of a bill passed by Parliament during the reference period.

Guarantee	Previous situation	Situation following the legislation adopted during the reference period
Control over the emergency procedure	The decision rested with the Standing Bureau, a collegial body in which the opposition is also represented.	The decision rests with the Speaker of Parliament, by resolution (Code on the Organization and Functioning of Parliament).

Safeguard	Previous situation	Situation following the adoption of legislation during the reference period
The right to be heard in public consultations	Oral recommendations presented during consultation sessions were recorded and reviewed.	Oral recommendations have been eliminated, and the requirement to record them has been removed (Law on Public Participation, Articles 13 and 14; Parliamentary Code). *Following a protest note from civil society organizations, the President of the Republic of Moldova returned the draft to Parliament, and it was reconsidered at the September 3 session. The provisions regarding verbal amendments were removed.
The right of a member of Parliament to form or join a new faction	A member of Parliament who left a faction could participate in the formation of a new faction, subject to the provisions of the law.	A member of Parliament who leaves a faction may not form a new faction and may not participate in the administrative leadership structures of Parliament.
Repeated Consultation on Amendments to the Bill	The criterion was a change of 30% of the text.	The criterion now refers to changes affecting the “content or effects” of the provisions—a formulation that allows for broad discretion.
Period for Nominating Candidates for the Office of President	30 days to collect at least 15,000 signatures from at least half of the second-level administrative-territorial units.	15 days, with the signature requirement remaining unchanged (Art. 137 in conjunction with Art. 139(1) of the Electoral Code).
Duration of the electoral restriction	A maximum of one year.	A maximum of four years—the duration of a full electoral cycle (Art. 102, para. (4))—which also applies in cases involving “disguised independent candidates” and “disguised support.”
Limits on the CEC’s ex officio intervention	Such authority does not exist in this form.	Jurisdiction to examine matters ex officio, with no specific statute of limitations, no obligation to hold a hearing, and no defined standard of proof (Art. 91, para. (12)).

Guarantee	Previous Situation	Situation following the adoption of the relevant legislation
Statute of the electoral body of the Gagauz autonomy	Electoral body with its own regulatory framework.	Chairperson appointed by decision of the CEC, with permanent status; the CEC is responsible for filling vacancies, approving the staffing structure, and appointing interim officials (Art. 36); new procedure for appeals (Art. 97, para. (2'), Art. 98, Art. 155 (4)).
Fiscal predictability	Election pledge: changes no more frequently than once every two years, with a four-year fiscal calendar.	Three rounds of tax changes in twelve months; the four-year tax calendar has not been published.
Political consensus on the appointment of judicial evaluators	Members of the external evaluation committees were appointed by Parliament by a qualified majority—61 votes, or 3/5—a threshold that required the agreement of at least part of the opposition.	If 61 votes are not reached, the candidate may be resubmitted and appointed with 51 votes—that is, by the governing majority alone (Law No. 26 of March 5, 2026, known as the VonHebel Law).
Limits on State Intervention	The review was linked to the existence of a “particular danger to state security,” as defined by Law No. 618/1995	Removing the word “significant” and the reference to Law No. 618/1995 broadens the authority’s discretion to any “threat to national security.”
Threshold for local consensus on modifying a locality’s boundaries	The decision regarding the merger, the administrative center, and the name of the local administrative unit (UAT) is adopted by a two-thirds majority of the elected council members; there is a 25-km limit between localities and a documented justification file.	The decision is adopted by a majority of the elected council members; the 25-km limit is eliminated; a “brief justification” and a list of localities are sufficient (Law No. 59 of April 24, 2026).

A methodological observation regarding this list: in three of the eight cases—the emergency procedure, oral recommendations, and the repeat consultation—the restriction was introduced via an amendment after the public consultation had concluded, and in two of those cases, just one day before the final vote.

This is, in our view, the central finding of the report. Not because each individual change is decisive, but because, taken together, they restrict precisely those mechanisms through which a society can challenge decisions that affect it—and they were adopted through the very procedure they restrict.

12. What Cannot Be Verified—and Why

12.1. Commitments Formulated in Such a Way That No One Can Verify Them

The first issue has less to do with transparency than with wording. We mechanically classified the 325 sector-specific actions in the electoral program based on the form of the statement—not its content—to determine how many of them can be verified by a third party:

Type of commitment	Number	Percentage
Quantified or time-bound (contains a figure, a deadline, or both)	114	35.1%
Regulatory (requires the adoption of a law)	11	3.4%
Expressing intention (verb that does not imply a result)	51	15.7%
Process-oriented (without a verifiable indicator)	149	45.8%
TOTAL	325	100%

Nearly two-thirds of the election platform—200 out of 325 sectoral commitments, or 61.5% — contain no figures, no deadlines, and no legislation to be adopted. There is no way for a citizen, a journalist, or an organization to determine whether “we will support the development of power grids” has been achieved or not.

This is not a criticism of intentions, but an observation about accountability. A commitment that cannot be verified cannot be broken either. In terms of political accountability, it is not a commitment.

12.2. Data that exists but is not proactively published

The second reason is transparency itself. For the items listed below, the information certainly exists with a public authority, but it is not published in a form that allows for effective monitoring. At the same time, **Law No. 148/2023 on access to information of public interest**, particularly **Articles 7, 10, and 11**, requires authorities to ensure proactive transparency, to publish relevant information on their own initiative, and to keep it up to date. Under these circumstances, the failure to publish information or the presentation of information in a format that is not sufficiently accessible limits the ability to verify progress and results. For each of the items listed below, the tables indicate the institution holding the information and the specific subject of the request.

Key observation: For most of these items, no request is necessary. They should be included in a progress report published periodically. Roadmap No. 276 is itself structured

with deadlines and responsible institutions “to facilitate progress monitoring”—but no public progress report on each action was available as of the date of this report.

To the list above, we add, for the second edition, four items that emerged during the monitoring process and for which the information certainly exists at a public authority but could not be obtained from open sources:

- **The evolution of energy tariffs and the share of energy expenses in the household budget**, by income category, during the reference period. None of the program’s twelve energy commitments uses the price paid by the end consumer as an indicator, so the question cannot be answered using the monitoring table.
- **The ratio of the nominal increase in pensions and public-sector wages to the inflation rate**, calculated for the period September 28, 2025–September 28, 2026. The component data are public; the consolidated calculation is not published by any authority.
- **The effect of agricultural transit through solidarity corridors on domestic producers** — volumes, product categories, and any protective measures applied. This request is addressed to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry and the Customs Service.
- **The commercial terms applied by the Moldovan Railway to transit shipments and the company’s financial results** for fiscal years 2025 and 2026. The request is addressed to the Moldovan Railway and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Regional Development, in its capacity as founder.

12.3. Questions Submitted but Left Unanswered

In order to obtain additional information for the assessment of certain indicators, requests were sent to several public institutions. As of the report’s publication date, no response had been received, even though the deadline set by Law 148/2023 had expired.

13. What We Are Asking for the Second Year

The recommendations below stem directly from the issues identified in the first-year assessment. They do not constitute a new government program, but rather a set of necessary corrections to address the identified shortcomings and ensure that ongoing reforms produce measurable results.

I. Catching Up on Delays and Accountability for Results

1. A public plan to address delays.

For each outstanding commitment, a priority, a deadline, the responsible institution, and measurable indicators must be established. The plan must be publicly updated so that progress can be independently verified.

2. A mechanism to unblock delayed projects.

For every project that misses its deadline, the cause of the delay, institutional responsibility, the new deadline, and remedial measures must be publicly explained. A delay cannot become a new deadline without an explanation.

3. Semiannual public reporting on the government's program.

Reporting must be based on results, indicators, and impact, not on the number of laws passed, meetings held, or activities carried out.

II. Clearer rules for the functioning of the state

4. Clear rules for transparency in decision-making.

Drafts that have been substantially amended must be resubmitted for consultation before adoption. The draft text, summaries of proposals, and the agendas for plenary and committee meetings must be published in advance, and there must be a reasonable minimum interval between the publication of the final draft and the vote.

5. Limiting the state's discretionary decisions.

The exercise of state powers must be based on clear legal criteria, reasoned decisions, effective judicial review, meaningful avenues for appeal, and institutional accountability.

6. Evaluation of the results of major legislative acts.

For major reforms, the problem to be solved, the costs, the beneficiaries, the outcome indicators, and the timeframe within which the effects must be evaluated must be established from the outset. The enactment of a law should not be confused with the resolution of the problem for which the law was enacted.

III. Economic stability and income growth

7. Fiscal stability and predictable rules.

The government must publish a fiscal calendar for the next four years and limit untimely tax changes. Major changes must be preceded by an assessment of their impact on households and the business environment.

8. A strategy for increasing real incomes.

Wage growth must be linked to productivity, inflation, and the actual cost of living. The goal should not be merely to increase nominal wages, but to increase real purchasing power.

9. A strategy for increasing and diversifying exports.

Distinct annual targets must be set for domestically produced goods and exported services, as well as indicators regarding value added, market diversification, and the competitiveness of local producers.

10. Concrete support for SMEs and local producers.

Economic policies should be evaluated based on reductions in tax compliance time and costs, access to financing, regulatory predictability, and the ability of businesses to invest and export.

IV. Investments and Infrastructure

11. Accelerating infrastructure development.

For major projects, the value of contracts, physical progress, payments made, contractual deadlines, kilometers completed and accepted, and the causes of any delays.

12. Public monitoring of investments financed by European and external funds.

For each project, the stages from contracting through completion and commissioning must be publicly tracked: funding amount, contractor, deadline, physical progress, payments, and any delays. Mobilized funding should not be confused with delivered infrastructure.

V. Public Services and Administrative Reform

13. Administrative reform measured by the services received by citizens.

Territorial and institutional reorganization must be evaluated based on the accessibility, quality, and cost of public services, not simply on the number of municipalities or institutions that have been abolished. Any reorganization must demonstrate a concrete benefit for citizens and take into account the will of the communities.