



Construim
în**CREDeRe**!

CIVIC MOVEMENT “CONSTRUIM ÎNCREDERE”

Position Paper

THE PARLIAMENT CODE:

how parliamentary transparency

was hollowed out

*What civil society asked for
and what the majority voted for*

Analysis of the summary of amendments,
proposals and objections

to the draft Code on the
Organisation and Functioning of Parliament

(No. 110 of 06.04.2026) — second reading

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Executive Summary

The summary of amendments to the draft Parliament Code makes it possible to verify, document by document, what happened to the proposals submitted by civil society. The conclusion is unambiguous. Most proposals put forward by civil society were rejected.

Of the 19 proposals submitted by the Civic Movement “Construim Încredere”, 17 were rejected in full. One was partially accepted. In only one case was the objective achieved, but through an amendment submitted by an MP from the parliamentary majority, not through the Movement’s proposal.

Beyond the figures, two patterns of approach emerge from an analysis of the summary.

Pattern one: rejection through circular referral

On three occasions, the Movement requested that Articles 9, 41 and 43 be supplemented with specific public consultation obligations: minimum time limits, publication of received contributions, an obligation to show how recommendations were analysed, and reasons for rejections. Each time, the committee rejected the proposal using the same wording:

“Not accepted. The recommendations refer mainly to Chapter VIII of the draft.”

The referral to Chapter VIII would have been a legitimate response if that chapter had contained the safeguards requested. The problem is that, in the same document, Chapter VIII was itself weakened through accepted amendments. Civil society was referred to a chapter that was simultaneously being dismantled.

Pattern two: the systematic erasure of the record

The accepted amendments submitted by MPs from the majority do not add spectacular restrictions. They remove. They remove the obligation to announce the number of votes on amendments. They remove the obligation to report publicly after hearings. They remove transcripts of committee meetings. They remove the obligation for the committee report to correspond to the minutes. They remove the verbal channel for submitting recommendations. Each deletion, taken separately, can be presented as “cutting red tape”. Taken together, they eliminate the traceability of parliamentary decision-making.

Part I. What the Movement proposed and what was rejected

Without exception, the Movement’s 19 interventions addressed the same problem: the draft regulates in detail how Parliament functions in relation to itself while leaving its relationship with citizens vague. Below are each proposal, the requested wording and the reason invoked for rejection.

No.	Article	What the Movement requested	Committee verdict
1	Art. 9, 41, 43	Transparency package: minimum consultation periods, publication of contributions, obligation to show how recommendations were analysed, reasons for rejections, institutionalised dialogue, consultation calendar	Not accepted
2	Art. 18	Redefining refusal to take the oath: distinction between explicit refusal and justified absence, confirmation in plenary, publication	Partially accepted
3	Art. 21	Status of a non-affiliated MP: full exercise of the mandate, right to speak, submit amendments and ask questions	Not accepted
4	Art. 37	Impartiality of the President of Parliament; removal of the open-ended phrase “or in accordance with decisions of Parliament”; procedural challenge mechanism	Not accepted
5	Art. 41	Right of each parliamentary faction to place at least one item on the weekly agenda, proportionate to its representation	Not accepted
6	Art. 42 para. (7)	Subcommittees: proportional representation, opposition chairmanship of at least half of the subcommittees, publication of the list	Not accepted
7	Art. 43	Repetition of the transparency package at the level of the powers of standing committees	Not accepted
8	Art. 57 para. (3)	Draft agenda prepared no later than Thursday of the preceding week and published immediately; amendments published without delay and reasoned	Not accepted
9	Art. 59	Agenda amendments proposed at least 24 hours in advance; prohibition on introducing organic or constitutional laws on the day of the sitting	Not accepted
10	Art. 60	Limiting the chair’s power to amend the agenda during a sitting to emergencies and force majeure, with the reason recorded in the transcript	Not accepted
11	Art. 71	Objective and exhaustive criteria for the urgent procedure; plenary approval of urgency; quarterly public report on use of urgent procedure	Not accepted
12	Art. 72	Prohibition on holding the first and second readings at the same sitting except in cases of imminent risk; at least 5 working days for recommendations even under urgency	Not accepted
13	Art. 74	Limitation of the simplified procedure: not applicable to organic laws, bills with budgetary impact or those restricting fundamental rights	Not accepted
14	Art. 79	Notice of a committee meeting published at least 72 hours in advance, together with the agenda and documents	Not accepted
15	Art. 83 / Art. 9 para. (5)	Committee meetings are public; access for the press and interested parties may not be restricted by rules of	Not accepted

	the Standing Bureau; closed meetings permitted only for classified information, with reasons published	
16 Art. 88	Minimum interval of 5 working days between approval of the report for second reading and the plenary vote; publication of the consolidated version	Not accepted
17 Art. 101 para. (4)	Removal of the 60-minute cap on questions and answers at first reading	Not accepted
18 Art. 110 para. (3)	Removal of the 60-minute cap for the third reading	Objective achieved through another amendment
19 Art. 175 para. (8)	30 working days for recommendations from interested parties; minimum 10 days under urgency; full publication of recommendations	Not accepted

The most serious rejections, in detail

1. The transparency package (Arts. 9, 41 and 43)

The Movement requested that the principle of decision-making transparency set out in Art. 9 para. (2) be accompanied by verifiable obligations:

- establishing clear minimum periods for conducting public consultations;
- mandatory publication of contributions received and their summary;
- establishing an obligation to present how the recommendations submitted were analysed;
- giving reasons for rejecting proposals submitted by interested stakeholders;
- strengthening mechanisms of institutionalised dialogue with civil society, academia, local public authorities and professional organisations;
- publication of the calendar of parliamentary consultations and hearings.

The committee's response — identical on all three occasions: *"Not accepted. The recommendations refer mainly to Chapter VIII of the draft."*

WHY IT MATTERS The referral to Chapter VIII is the only argument used against this package. Yet in Chapter VIII, the accepted amendment submitted by MP Radu Marian removed precisely the obligation to include recommendations in the summary (Art. 175 para. (4)) and introduced an additional ground for rejection. The committee's argument cancels itself out within the same document.

2. Committee meetings: public nature (Art. 83 and Art. 9 para. (5))

The draft leaves access by the press and interested parties to meetings of working bodies to be governed "in accordance with the norms and rules approved by the Standing Bureau". The Movement requested that this access be guaranteed by the Code and not be capable of restriction through acts of the Standing Bureau, with closed meetings permitted exclusively

for information classified in accordance with the law and subject to reasons being recorded and published.

The Movement's justification: "The public nature of committee meetings is a minimum standard of parliamentary transparency, enshrined in PACE Resolution 1601/2008 and in the Inter-Parliamentary Union's guidelines on parliamentary transparency. The unconditional delegation of the regulation of access to the Standing Bureau creates a risk of arbitrary restriction of public access, which is incompatible with the EU accession commitments undertaken by the Republic of Moldova."

Rejected without substantive reasoning. The delegation to the Standing Bureau remains in the text.

3. Public consultation period (Art. 175 para. (8))

The Movement requested that the period granted to civil society be aligned with the 30-day period available to MPs for amendments, referring to the European Commission's Better Regulation standards and Law No. 239/2008, which already provides for 15 working days as the minimum standard.

The proposal was rejected. What happened instead to this paragraph is addressed in Part II, point 8 — and is more serious than a simple rejection.

4. Timely publication of the agenda (Arts. 57, 59 and 60)

Three related proposals concerned the predictability of the parliamentary agenda: publication of the draft agenda 5–7 days in advance, limiting last-minute changes to no later than 24 hours before the sitting, prohibiting the introduction of draft organic or constitutional laws on the day of the sitting, and limiting the chair's power to alter the agenda during the sitting.

The Movement's justification: "Publication one day in advance makes public participation formal rather than real. This approach is standard in European parliaments — the Bundestag publishes the agenda at least one week in advance, and the European Parliament two weeks in advance."

All three were rejected. The same request, formulated more moderately by CRJM (3 working days) and by Promo-LEX, was also rejected. No proposal concerning agenda predictability was accepted.

5. Convening committee meetings 72 hours in advance (Art. 79)

The Movement requested publication of the notice, provisional agenda and documents at least 72 hours in advance, with the possibility of reducing this to 24 hours in exceptional situations, provided that the reasons are stated and recorded. Rejected. The Code contains no minimum period for convening committees — which means that a committee may be convened and take decisions on the same day without anyone outside Parliament finding out in time.

6. Bringing discipline to the urgent procedure (Arts. 71 and 72)

The Movement requested that urgency be justified by objective and exhaustive criteria — imminent risk to security, public order or health; an international obligation subject to a fixed deadline; force majeure — and that it be approved by the plenary before being triggered. It also requested a quarterly public report on the use of urgent procedure, including an alert mechanism if more than 30% of the laws in a parliamentary year follow this route.

It further requested that even under urgency the draft be published immediately and that at least 5 working days be allowed for recommendations, identifying a specific risk:

“Art. 72 contains no reference to the obligation of public consultation. [...] Combined with the possibility that the first and second readings may take place at the same sitting (Art. 72 para. (4)), there is a real risk that civil society could be completely excluded from the process.”

Both proposals were rejected. The same observation made by the People’s Advocate — strict eligibility criteria to align with GRECO standards — was classified as a “recommendation of a general nature”.

7. The interval between committee approval and the final vote (Art. 88)

The Movement requested an interval of at least 5 working days between approval of the report for second reading and the plenary vote, with publication of the consolidated version of the draft during that interval, as well as an absolute rule: under no circumstances may the final text be made available less than 24 hours before the vote.

The Movement’s justification: “[The interval] allows civil society and the media to verify whether the approved amendments correspond to those published in the summary; it prevents last-minute changes between the committee vote and the plenary vote, a practice identified as a risk by the Venice Commission in several opinions concerning accelerated legislative procedures.”

Rejected. The Code provides for no minimum interval between the committee report and the final vote.

8. The opposition in subcommittees (Art. 42 para. (7))

The Movement requested that subcommittees — the only bodies currently envisaged as being chaired by the opposition (although we must acknowledge that they are provided for in the Rules of Procedure of Parliament but are not in fact established) — respect proportional representation, and that at least half of them be chaired by the opposition, with publication of the list of active subcommittees.

“Excluding the opposition from chairing these bodies deprives the parliamentary minority’s right to influence the legislative process at the technical, not merely political, level of real substance. A practice already established in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova deserves to be institutionalised, not abandoned.”

Rejected.

9. The rest: status of non-affiliated MPs, impartiality of the President, simplified procedure

The proposal concerning Art. 21 — that an MP who loses membership of a parliamentary faction should continue to exercise the mandate in full, with the right to speak, submit amendments and ask questions — was rejected. The proposal concerning Art. 37 — the obligation of impartiality of the President of Parliament and removal of the open-ended phrase “or in accordance with decisions of Parliament” from point (k) — was rejected. The proposal concerning Art. 74 — that the simplified procedure should not apply to organic laws, bills with budgetary impact or those restricting fundamental rights — was rejected; instead, the simplified procedure was expanded through an amendment submitted by the majority (Part II, point 6).

Part II. The toxic provisions that were accepted

This section deals exclusively with accepted amendments submitted by MPs from the majority faction that make the draft worse than its initial version. They are ranked by severity.

No.	Article	What was removed / changed	Author
1	Art. 210 (in full)	All public reporting obligations following parliamentary hearings	Radu MARIAN
2	Art. 108 para. (3)	Announcement and recording of the number of votes on amendments	Radu MARIAN
3	Art. 106 para. (3)	Prohibition on putting to a vote amendments not discussed in committee	Radu MARIAN
4	Art. 175 para. (1)(b), (3), (4), (6); para. (7)	Verbal channel for recommendations; obligation to include recommendations in the summary; principle of balancing interests. Plus a new ground for rejection	Radu MARIAN
5	Art. 91 para. (3)	Obligation for the report to be drafted in accordance with the minutes and transcripts	Radu MARIAN
6	Art. 81 para. (3) + title	Verbatim transcription of committee debates	Radu MARIAN
7	Art. 209 para. (4)	Application of public-access and record-keeping rules to hearings	Radu MARIAN
8	Art. 208 para. (3)	Obligation of committee members to attend hearings and quorum requirement	Radu MARIAN
9	Art. 175 para. (8)	The words “working” and “reasonable” — effectively shortening the period	Government proposal (different from what was accepted in committee!)
10	Art. 119 para. (5)	Right of an MP or faction to request a separate vote on amendments	Radu MARIAN

11	Art. 191 para. (3)	Expansion of the grounds for refusing information to MPs	Igor TALMAZAN
12	Art. 74 para. (3)	Turning the exception into the rule for ad hoc resolutions	Igor TALMAZAN
13	Art. 51 para. (3)	Express quorum requirement at opening, debate and voting	Igor TALMAZAN
14	Art. 91 para. (2)	Parliamentary factions removed from the list of authors mentioned in the summary	Igor TALMAZAN
15	Art. 174 para. (1)	Conditioning civil-society contributions on providing “reasoning”	Radu MARIAN
16	Art. 43 para. (6)	Reversal of the consultation relationship with experts and interested parties	Radu MARIAN

Analysis of each provision

1. Art. 210 — complete abolition of reporting after hearings

MP Radu Marian’s amendment: “*Article 210 is excluded.*” Accepted.

The deleted text provided that:

- para. (1) — after hearings, committees approve reports containing a summary of the issues debated, the accepted and rejected proposals, final conclusions and recommendations;
- para. (2) — the report is published within 10 days on the official website and sent to the persons or authorities concerned;
- para. (3) — within 6 months, the committee examines implementation of the recommendations and prepares a monitoring table.

The justification invoked: “*the elimination of bureaucratic and redundant rules. Committee reporting and monitoring activity is already regulated by the general rules governing their functioning.*”

WHY IT IS TOXIC Parliamentary hearings are the main instrument through which citizens and organisations can be heard directly by the legislature. Without a mandatory report, without publication and without a six-month follow-up, a hearing becomes an event without consequence: people are heard, but nothing is recorded, no response is given and no follow-up takes place. The claim that “general rules” already cover this is contradicted by the Code itself — no other provision requires a public report after hearings.

2. Art. 108 para. (3) — disappearance of vote counts on amendments

Deleted text: “*The result of the vote — the number of votes ‘For’ or ‘Against’ — shall be announced by the chair of the sitting and recorded in the transcript.*”

The justification invoked: the paragraph “*introduces unnecessary and ambiguous procedural confusion.*”

WHY IT IS TOXIC This is the most direct blow to voting transparency. Without the announcement and recording of the figures, no one outside the chamber can later establish by what margin an amendment was rejected — or whether it was put to a vote at all.

The same amendment also removed para. (4), which guaranteed the author the right to withdraw an amendment before the vote.

3. Art. 106 para. (3) — opening the door to last-minute amendments

Deleted text: *“The chair of the sitting is prohibited from proposing for debate or vote an amendment that has not been discussed by the standing committee responsible for substantive examination.”*

WHY IT IS TOXIC This prohibition was the only barrier in the Code against the practice of introducing texts directly in plenary for a vote even though they had never passed through committee examination, an opinion, the summary or public consultation. Once removed, an amendment may appear in the chamber and become law on the same day.

The context makes the deletion even harder to justify. On the same page of the summary, the General Legal Directorate of the Parliament Secretariat refers to Constitutional Court Judgment No. 14/2024, in which the Court found a procedural defect regarding the voting of amendments and the absence of an indispensable connection between the subject matter of the draft voted at first reading and the amendments to it, and requested that Art. 106 be supplemented *“with clear regulations in this regard”*.

The committee classified the Legal Directorate’s observation as a *“recommendation of a general nature”* — while accepting the deletion of the safeguard that already existed. The Constitutional Court asked for more rules; Parliament voted for fewer.

4. Arts. 174–175 — dismantling public consultation from within

MP Radu Marian’s amendment to Art. 175, accepted in full, makes four interventions:

Intervention	Text in the draft	Effect
Para. (1)(b) is deleted	“verbally — during public consultation meetings or in other official working formats”	The verbal channel for submitting recommendations disappears. What is said during a public consultation no longer constitutes a recommendation within the meaning of the Code.
Para. (3) is deleted	“The submission of recommendations in verbal form shall be recorded in the minutes of the respective meetings.”	A logical consequence of the first change: there is no longer an obligation to record what was said.
Para. (4) is deleted	“Recommendations received at the drafting stage or during the public consultation stage of the draft decision shall be included in the summary of recommendations.”	The obligation to include recommendations in the summary disappears. This is exactly the safeguard that the committee

Para. (6) is deleted	“the committee [...] shall seek to balance individual, sectoral and general interests”	invoked three times to reject the Movement’s package. The only substantive criterion for evaluating recommendations disappears.
Para. (7) is supplemented	“has the right to reject recommendations formulated vaguely or that are irrelevant”	“insufficiently reasoned” is added — a third discretionary ground for rejection, without criteria.

In Art. 174, the same MP secured the addition of the phrase “*with reasoning*” to para. (1): contributions from civil-society organisations must now be submitted “*with reasoning*”. Combined with the new ground for rejecting recommendations as “*insufficiently reasoned*”, the result is a closed filter: the committee alone determines, without criteria, whether the reasoning is sufficient.

OBSERVATION The Government itself requested revision of para. (7), arguing that the provision “*does not establish clear and objective criteria for classifying recommendations as ‘vague’ or ‘irrelevant’*” and that every recommendation should be included in the summary table, with reasons given for acceptance or rejection. The committee rejected the Government’s observation — while at the same time accepting the addition of a third vague ground.

5. Art. 91 para. (3) — breaking the link between debate and report

Text in the draft: “*After examination and adoption of the report in committee, it shall be drafted taking into account the minutes of the standing committee meetings and the transcripts of the debates held during those meetings and shall be signed by the chair of the committee.*”

Accepted text: “*After examination and approval of the report in committee, it shall be drafted and signed by the chair of the committee.*”

WHY IT IS TOXIC The committee report is the document on which the plenary votes. The obligation to draft it in accordance with the minutes and transcripts was the anchor connecting the final text to what was actually discussed and decided during the meeting. Once removed, the report becomes a document that can be drafted at discretion between the committee meeting and the plenary, without any verifiable benchmark of conformity.

6. Art. 81 — removal of transcripts from committees

The accepted amendment deletes para. (3) — “*The chair of the standing committee may decide on the verbatim transcription of the debates*” — and even changes the title of the article itself, from “*Minutes and verbatim transcription of debates during meetings of standing committees*” to “*Minutes of meetings of standing committees*”. Verbatim transcription disappears from the Code as an institution.

The justification invoked: the minutes are published, meetings are broadcast live and/or recorded, and transcription “*would require additional resources and capacities [...] which are not justified*”.

WHY IT IS TOXIC The argument collapses upon verification. In the same summary, under Art. 79 para. (5), the committee rejected the request to make live broadcasting of committee meetings mandatory on the grounds that “*Parliament does not have the technical capacity to broadcast simultaneously the meetings of all standing committees live*”. Transcripts are removed because broadcasts exist; broadcasts are not guaranteed because the technical capacity does not exist. Both justifications cannot be true at the same time.

The combined effect with point 5 is what matters: committee transcripts no longer exist, while the report no longer has to correspond to the minutes. In documentary terms, the committee debate becomes invisible.

7–8. Arts. 208 and 209 — hearings without quorum and without public-access rules

Two accepted amendments submitted by the same MP complete the dismantling of Art. 210:

Art. 209 para. (4), deleted: “*The provisions of this Code concerning the public nature of meetings, the chairing of committee meetings, the preparation of minutes, as well as the verbatim transcription of parliamentary committee meetings, shall apply accordingly.*” Hearings are thus removed from the public-access and record-keeping regime applicable to committee meetings.

Art. 208 para. (3), deleted: “*Members of the parliamentary committee are obliged to attend hearings organised by the committee. If the quorum is not met, the chair of the committee shall suspend the hearing and announce the day and time at which it will resume.*” A hearing may now take place with only one MP in the room.

THE OVERALL PICTURE The three amendments — Arts. 208, 209 and 210 — were submitted by the same MP and accepted together. The result: a public hearing may take place without MPs being present, without public-access rules, without mandatory minutes, without a report, without publication and without any verification of implementation. The institution of the parliamentary hearing remains in the Code as a name and disappears as a mechanism.

9. Art. 175 para. (8) — two words that shorten the period

Text in the draft: “*The period for submitting recommendations is 10 **working** days [...] unless the standing committee establishes another **reasonable** period.*”

Accepted text: “*The period for submitting recommendations is 10 days [...] unless the standing committee establishes another period.*”

The word “*working*” disappeared: 10 working days means approximately 14 calendar days; 10 calendar days means 10. The effective public consultation period was shortened by

approximately 30%. The word “reasonable” disappeared as well: the committee may set any other period, without any criterion of reasonableness.

AGGRAVATING CONTEXT The amendment was made in response to a request that went in exactly the opposite direction. The Government had requested extending the period from 10 to 15 days, expressly invoking the GRECO conclusion from the fifth evaluation round compliance report — the recommendation to **INCREASE** the statutory minimum periods for public consultation (para. 36 of GrecoRC5(2026)4). The committee marked the proposal “Accepted” and drafted a text that reduces the period. In the process of acceptance, a GRECO recommendation to increase the period was transformed into a reduction.

We recall that, under the same paragraph, the Movement’s proposal (30 working days) and CRJM’s proposal (at least 10 working days, reducible only in exceptional cases with publicly stated reasons) were rejected.

10. Art. 119 para. (5) — loss of separate voting on amendments

Deleted text: “Where the committee has accepted certain amendments rejected by the author, at the request of the author or of a parliamentary faction, Parliament shall put each amendment to a separate vote.”

The justification invoked: the paragraph “creates an excessive and unjustified procedure”.

The effect: an MP or parliamentary faction can no longer compel the plenary to vote separately on a controversial amendment included by the committee in its report. Contested amendments are voted on “as a package”, as part of the committee report, without the possibility of isolating them politically. This is a direct loss of an instrument for the opposition and for individual MPs.

11. Art. 191 para. (3) — expansion of the grounds for refusing information

Text in the draft: “Where the requested information or documents concern **state secrets**, access to such information shall be ensured in accordance with the law.”

Accepted text (Igor Talmazan amendment): “...concern state secrets **or another secret protected by law**, access to such information shall be ensured in accordance with the law.”

WHY IT IS TOXIC Article 191 regulates the right of Parliament, its working bodies and MPs to request information from the Government and public administration — the basic instrument of parliamentary oversight. Moving from “state secret”, a strictly defined category, to “any other secret protected by law” opens an indefinite list: commercial, banking, professional and tax secrecy. The authority subject to oversight may itself invoke the grounds on which it refuses information to those exercising oversight over it.

12. Art. 74 para. (3) — ad hoc resolutions become the rule

Text in the draft: “*Where necessary, certain draft resolutions resulting from parliamentary debates or initiated during plenary sittings shall be adopted under the simplified procedure without presentation of the committee report.*”

Accepted text (Igor Talmazan amendment): “*Draft resolutions initiated ad hoc and adopted during the plenary sitting, or resulting from parliamentary debates, shall be adopted under the simplified procedure without presentation of the committee report.*”

Two changes in a single sentence. The condition “*where necessary*” disappears — what was an exception becomes a general rule. And the phrase “*initiated ad hoc*” appears, expressly legalising resolutions born in the plenary chamber, without committee examination, without an opinion and without consultation. We recall that the Movement’s proposal to exclude organic laws, bills with budgetary impact and those restricting fundamental rights from the simplified procedure was rejected.

13. Art. 51 para. (3) — dilution of the quorum requirement

Text in the draft: “*At the opening of sittings, during debates on motions and when voting on Parliament’s decisions, the quorum must be observed in accordance with constitutional requirements.*”

Accepted text (Igor Talmazan amendment): the paragraph is deleted, while para. (2) is supplemented with the general formula “*The activity of the plenary of Parliament shall be chaired by the chair of the sitting in compliance with the quorum required by the Constitution.*”

The list of the three moments when quorum must be verified — opening of the sitting, debate of motions and voting — is lost, leaving only a general formula with no specific point of application. At the same time, MP Berlinschii’s amendment proposing that verification of quorum could be requested by a parliamentary faction or by at least 5 MPs was rejected. Therefore, there is neither a precise obligation nor an on-demand verification mechanism.

14–15. Two small interventions with a cumulative effect

Art. 174 para. (1). Contributions by civil-society organisations must be submitted “*with reasoning*”. Formally, this is a reasonable requirement. In practice, combined with the new ground for rejection of “*insufficiently reasoned*” recommendations in Art. 175 para. (7), it creates an admissibility standard whose assessment belongs exclusively to the committee that rejects the recommendation.

Art. 43 para. (6). The draft text provided that working groups made up of experts and representatives of interested parties were those “*whom committees consult in their activity*”. The accepted text provides that they are those “*who will consult the committees in their activity*”. The committee’s obligation to consult is transformed into the experts’ availability to provide consultation. The grammatical nuance contains a shift in responsibility: consultation is no longer a duty of the committee.

Conclusions and public demands

What the document shows

The 263-page summary does not describe a difference of opinion between civil society and the parliamentary majority. It describes a coherent operation whose internal logic becomes visible when the accepted amendments are read together.

Stage of the legislative process	What safeguard was removed or refused
Announcement of the agenda	All minimum deadlines for publication of the agenda (Arts. 57, 59, 60) and for convening committees (Art. 79) were rejected
Public consultation	The verbal channel, its recording and the obligation to include recommendations in the summary were removed (Art. 175); the period was shortened by deleting the word “working”
Committee debate	Transcripts were removed (Art. 81), as was the obligation for the report to correspond to them (Art. 91)
Public hearings	Quorum (Art. 208), public-access rules (Art. 209) and reporting in full (Art. 210) were removed
Voting on amendments	Announcement of vote counts (Art. 108) and the right to a separate vote (Art. 119) were removed
Last-minute amendments	The prohibition on voting on texts not discussed in committee was removed (Art. 106); the minimum interval before the final vote was rejected (Art. 88)
Parliamentary oversight	The grounds for refusing information to MPs were expanded (Art. 191)

Each intervention was presented as a clarification, simplification or removal of bureaucracy. None imposes an additional obligation on the majority. All reduce what can be verified from outside.

CENTRAL CONCLUSION In the version voted at second reading, the Code retains in Art. 9 the principle that “*the activity of Parliament is public*” and that “*the principle of decision-making transparency governs the legislative process*”. What has been systematically removed are the mechanisms through which someone outside Parliament could prove that the principle was respected.

The contradictions we are raising publicly

First. The Movement’s transparency package was rejected three times on the grounds that it concerned Chapter VIII — while, in the same document, Chapter VIII was being weakened through amendments accepted from the majority. The reason given for rejection was invalidated within the same summary.

Second. Verbatim transcription of committee meetings was removed on the grounds that meetings are broadcast live. The obligation to broadcast them live had been rejected 60 pages

earlier on the grounds of insufficient technical capacity. The two justifications are mutually exclusive.

Third. The GRECO recommendation to increase minimum public-consultation periods, expressly invoked by the Government, was marked “*Accepted*” and transposed into a text that shortens the period by deleting the word “*working*”.

Fourth. The General Legal Directorate invoked Constitutional Court Judgment No. 14/2024 to request stricter rules on amendments unrelated to the draft voted at first reading. The observation was classified as a “*recommendation of a general nature*”, while the existing safeguard in Art. 106 para. (3) was removed.

Fifth. The Government itself requested clear criteria for rejecting civil-society recommendations, pointing out that “*vague*” and “*irrelevant*” are undefined concepts. The observation was rejected, and a third equally undefined ground was added to the same concepts: “*insufficiently reasoned*”.

What we demand

The Civic Movement “Construim Încredere” publicly calls on Parliament to:

- Reintroduce Art. 210 in the form contained in the draft — mandatory report after hearings, publication within 10 days, verification of implementation of recommendations after 6 months.
- Restore Art. 108 para. (3) — announcement and recording in the transcript of the number of votes “For” and “Against” on every amendment put to a vote.
- Restore Art. 106 para. (3) — prohibition on putting to debate or vote an amendment that has not been discussed by the committee responsible for substantive examination.
- Restore Art. 175 para. (1)(b), (3) and (4) — the verbal channel for recommendations, the recording of such recommendations, and the unconditional obligation to include all recommendations in the summary, with reasons given for rejection.
- Remove the phrase “*insufficiently reasoned*” from Art. 175 para. (7) and define by law the criteria for rejecting a recommendation.
- Restore the word “*working*” in Art. 175 para. (8) and increase the period to at least 15 working days, in accordance with the GRECO recommendation in the fifth evaluation round compliance report.
- Restore Art. 91 para. (3) — the obligation for the committee report to be drafted taking into account the minutes and transcripts of the debates.
- Restore Art. 81 para. (3) and verbatim transcription as an institution or, alternatively, establish an unconditional obligation to live-stream all public committee meetings, with accessible archiving.

- Restore Art. 208 para. (3) and Art. 209 para. (4) — mandatory quorum at hearings and application of public-access and record-keeping rules.
- Restore Art. 119 para. (5) — the right of an MP or parliamentary faction to request a separate vote on each amendment.
- Return to the wording “*state secrets*” in Art. 191 para. (3), without the undefined extension to “*any other secret protected by law*”.
- Reintroduce the condition “*where necessary*” in Art. 74 para. (3) and exclude organic laws, bills with budgetary impact and those restricting fundamental rights from the simplified procedure.
- Establish a minimum period for publication of the plenary agenda and for convening committees, in line with the proposals rejected under Arts. 57 and 79.
- Establish a minimum interval between approval of the report for second reading and the plenary vote, in line with the proposal rejected under Art. 88.
- Publish, in due time before examination at third reading, the consolidated version of the Code and the updated summary of amendments, proposals and objections, so that all changes made after the second reading can be effectively verified.

Commitments undertaken in the Roadmap

The Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, approved by Government Decision No. 276 of 14 May 2025, included the strategic results “*4. Parliamentary accountability, transparency and civil-society participation in the decision-making process are strengthened*” and “*10. Public consultation mechanisms are designed in an inclusive manner, enabling civil society and citizens to participate in and contribute to the decision-making process*”, **yet the amendments adopted are aimed at reducing civil-society involvement in the decision-making process and may affect progress in implementing the commitments undertaken.**

We therefore request that the EU’s assessment of the Republic of Moldova’s progress under Cluster 1 record not only the fact that the Code has been adopted, but also whether it contains the safeguards expressly listed in the National Accession Programme — first and foremost, safeguards against abuse of the urgent procedure, which were proposed and rejected during this process.

Civic Movement “Construiam Încredere”

The analysis is based entirely on the official summary of amendments, proposals and objections to draft No. 110 of 06.04.2026, second reading.

