

## **When 41 farmers are presented as a success, but thousands of agricultural producers remain in crisis**

The “Building Trust” Movement considers that the discussion about support granted to agricultural producers must be brought back to reality, not to triumphalist communication.

In its latest public statements, the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture presented several state interventions as solutions for the sector: the Agricultural Credit Facility, VAT reimbursement, compensation of excise duty on diesel, drought aid, payment of subsidies and other administrative measures.

The problem is not that these instruments do not exist. The problem is that they are presented as if they responded proportionally to a deep crisis, while the reality on the ground shows something else: indebted farmers, lack of liquidity, losses caused by drought, high input costs, unstable prices, subsidy arrears and an increasingly strong feeling that the state reacts late and only partially.

A telling example is the agricultural working capital component within the FCA. According to official MAIA data, by 22 May 2026, only **41 agricultural businesses** had accessed this component, with a total value of **16.54 million lei**, representing only **3.37% of the total volume of FCA resources granted**.

Compared to an indicative number of 10,000 farmers, these 41 beneficiaries represent **0.41%**. Compared to 30,000 farmers, this means **0.14%**. In other words, a measure that reaches an extremely small fraction of the sector cannot be presented as a major solution for agriculture.

The FCA can be a useful instrument, but mainly for farmers who are still bankable, who can demonstrate repayment capacity, who have collateral and who can pass the assessment of a commercial bank. For agricultural producers already in debt, with repeated losses and without liquidity, a new loan is not necessarily a rescue. In some cases, it may become only a new burden.

Likewise, VAT reimbursement is necessary, but it does not represent direct support. It is the return of money that already belongs to the economic operator. Compensation of excise duty on diesel partially reduces a cost, but it does not cover production losses. Aid for the 2025 drought comes only in

2026 and is limited in terms of budget. Subsidy arrears directly affect farmers' trust in the state.

In other European states, reactions to agricultural crises have been faster and more consistent. In Romania, the European Commission approved in 2024 a state aid scheme of 400 million euros to compensate farmers affected by severe drought, in the form of direct grants. In Spain, the Government approved a package of approximately 2.2 billion euros to combat the effects of drought, including more than **636 million euros** in direct aid for farmers. In Poland, the Government announced subsidies for farmers affected by low grain prices, including support per tonne and per hectare. At European Union level, in the context of liquidity problems, Member States were allowed to increase advances to farmers **up to 70% of direct payments and up to 85% for area- and animal-based interventions.**

These examples show the difference between a crisis response and crisis communication. In European states, when agricultural producers come under major pressure, intervention is not limited to listing loans, reimbursements and promises. The discussion is about direct grants, compensation for losses, guarantee schemes, postponements or restructuring of debts, payment advances and market measures.

But, in order not to refer only to examples from European Union Member States, it is also worth analysing Georgia's experience in attracting non-reimbursable European funds for agriculture and rural development. Georgia treated rural development as a strategic priority and benefited from substantial investments and long-term European policies through the European Union's ENPARD Programme, implemented continuously during 2014–2025, with a total budget of 234.5 million euros. <https://eu4georgia.eu/enpard/>

- Phase I (2014–2017) – 52 million euros;
- Phase II (2016–2019) – 50 million euros;
- Phase III (2018–2022) – 77.5 million euros;
- Phase IV (2021–2025) – 55 million euros.

Georgia thus managed to attract, over the long term, substantial non-reimbursable European resources for agriculture and rural development. During the same period, the Republic of Moldova benefited practically from a single ENPARD programme, implemented during 2015–2021, with a total

budget of approximately 64 million euros, of which around 53 million euros represented budget support.

This difference reflects not only the level of funding attracted, but also important differences in strategic approach, institutional continuity and the capacity to use European opportunities for the development of agriculture and rural areas.

This is happening while more and more agricultural producers are facing not only a lack of liquidity, but also the accumulation of debts, penalties, the risk of forced enforcement and the impossibility of accessing new loans. For many small and medium-sized farmers, instruments based exclusively on lending no longer represent a real solution.

At the same time, agriculture in the Republic of Moldova remains vulnerable to drought and climate change, in the absence of sufficient investments in irrigation and effective mechanisms for protection against agricultural risks. More and more producers state that they are operating below the real cost of production, in conditions of unstable prices and support that is insufficiently adapted to the realities on the ground.

The “Building Trust” Movement considers that the agricultural sector urgently needs real measures: fast and predictable payments, proportional compensation for losses, support for small and medium-sized farmers and investments in the climate resilience of agriculture.

In the absence of rapid and coherent interventions, the Republic of Moldova risks accelerating bankruptcies in rural areas and the gradual disappearance of family farms.

Farmers are told that solutions exist, but many of them do not actually feel them. And when only 41 beneficiaries are presented as proof of success, an obvious gap appears between the official message and the reality in agricultural households.

**The “Building Trust” Movement** considers that the agricultural sector needs a serious approach, not cosmetic reporting. We need clear answers:

- How many farmers applied for support and how many were rejected?
- How many agricultural producers can no longer access loans?
- What is the value of the state’s arrears to agricultural producers?
- How much support actually reaches small and medium-sized farmers?

- How many agricultural households are at risk of bankruptcy?

How quickly does the money reach farmers, not just how many measures are announced?

Agriculture cannot be saved through declarations. It needs real liquidity, fast payments, compensation proportional to losses, debt restructuring, functional guarantees, predictability and public policies adapted to the reality on the ground.

When thousands of agricultural producers are facing debts, drought and the risk of bankruptcy, the state must not turn a few dozen loans into a success story. The state must demonstrate that it can protect a strategic sector for the economy and food security of the Republic of Moldova.

When farmers are on the verge of bankruptcy, the state must not boast about a few dozen loans. The state must demonstrate that it has a real plan for saving, recovering and modernizing the agriculture of the Republic of Moldova

## **The Civic Movement “Building Trust”**

**28.05.2026**